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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-93-037

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6 October 1993

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## CIS: ARMED FORCES

### Creation of CIS 'Defense Community' Urged

934F1185A Moscow NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL  
in English No 37, Sep 93 pp 12-14

[Article by Arkady Moshes: "Security Problems: Security Is Worth Unity"]

[Text]

### The Commonwealth of Independent States Has to Solve the Defense Problem. The Tajik Experience Shows That the Problem is Overdue

The Collective Security Treaty was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia in Tashkent last May. But it has failed to work to this day, and it hadn't even gone into effect till August 1993 because it wasn't ratified by Russia.

For a long time Russia didn't show any interest in implementation of this Treaty, because, firstly, it hadn't been, for obvious reasons, signed by Ukraine, the second biggest military power of the CIS. Secondly, Belarus failed to show any interest in joining the Treaty for a year, which was unexpected to many and emphasized the extra-European nature of the document. Even now, after Belarus formally joined the alliance, her participation in it will in all likelihood be rather limited.

Thirdly, the Tajik developments have demonstrated that the Central Asian states which were vitally interested in joint actions, preferred for a long time to pin hopes on Russia, refraining from sending their own citizens to be killed by Tajik fighters.

Fourthly, a literal interpretation of the Treaty in fact allowed Armenia to hope for military aid in her conflict with Azerbaijan, which other countries were reluctant to grant her.

Article 4 of the Tashkent Treaty provides for joint repulsion of aggression and calls for a definition of the term. As long as no such definition exists, it's not clear whether Armenia is an object or the subject of aggression.

### What Does 'Aggressor' Mean?

The definition of "aggressor," currently accepted by the world community, contains the notion of a "state which has declared war on another state and has carried out military invasion, an attack on the land, in the sea or air and has blockaded its coastline or seaports." However, Afghan fighters don't fall under this definition, thus depriving the members of the security system of the right to collective self-defense. It's obvious that the text of the Tashkent Treaty has to be supplemented by a new interpretation of the term "aggression" to also include non-state subjects of international relations into the jurisdiction of the Treaty. Incidentally, the notion of aggression is altogether absent in the corresponding

articles of the North Atlantic Treaty, being replaced by a more clear category "military invasion."

The second circumstance concerns the procedure of decision making on aiding the victim of aggression. The same Article 4 says that the allies shall grant the victim of aggression "the necessary aid, including military," while, according to Article 8, the decision on using military force is made by the heads of the states.

It's not clear, firstly, who knows the size of the necessary aid; secondly, whether military aid will be at all granted, if the heads of the states fail to decide on using military force; thirdly, whether this decision is made on the basis of consensus or by simple or qualified majority vote. In other words, the procedure of sending troops (automatically or not; under whose aegis; with or without the right to refuse) thus far remains absolutely unsettled.

The inability of the Six to make practical steps reflects the amorphous nature of the CIS.

The ratifying of the Tashkent Treaty by Russian Parliament, the recognition of the Tajik-Afghan border as common CIS state border at the August summit of Russian and Central Asian leaders in Moscow, as well as Belarus's joining the Treaty and the sending of troops to Tajikistan by the Central Asian states, bespeak tangible changes in these countries' approach to creation of a collective security system. In fact, this is promising of transition to even something greater than a collective security system: This lays the foundation for a defense community (common defense expense).

### The Russian Interest

Creation of a defense community is today in the interests of all countries who have signed the Tashkent Treaty, even if their national interests and their approaches to ensuring security are far from perfectly identical.

None of these states, except Russia, is able to guarantee adequate reaction to military challenges to their security. There remain serious doubts even in the case of Russia, because the army of this country undergoes the process of a large-scale reorganization and reform, withdrawal and re-deployment of large military forces. All this is aggravated by undermanning and social problems.

As the defense community consolidates, in addition to the possibility to extend aid in neutralizing the "southern challenge" and threats proceeding from local conflicts, Russia will avail herself of a legal basis for interference. The process of disarmament, especially nuclear, will continue. Russia's possible nuclear guarantee to her allies will impede the spread of nukes, trigger nuclear disarmament in Kazakhstan and bring Russia additional political capital.

The creation of an integrated defense community can reduce the costs of military reforms in Russia. In particular, part of military equipment to be destroyed could be transferred, or even better, sold at reduced prices to



Russia's allies, (certainly, after this step is agreed upon with other European participants in the agreement on conventional forces).

The demographic factor will also play its part in it. The Russian Army, which is only half-manned with soldiers and non-coms, could accept conscripts from the Central Asia, who would be properly trained (of course, not in engineering detachments, as was the case quite recently, but in combat, possibly multinational, units). Training of officers in Russian military schools could help support these schools. Lastly, we shouldn't forget that trained reserve contingents, which were in their time assigned to the present Russian units, are now in the Central Asian republics.

The creation of a defense community will settle the problem of deployment of Russian troops in the territory of other CIS states; it will help create outposts in these countries and promote combat training of mobile forces in the conditions of diverse landscape and various theatres of operations; it will play its role in enhancing Russia's military presence in the Caspian region.... On the whole, this will lead to various forms of military reintegration of ex-Soviet republics.

#### To Concede Sovereignty?

Apart from the general stabilizing effect and effective neutralization of the southern threat, it's also of importance to other member states of the collective security system that they will retain access to Russian weapons systems, the possibility to have them serviced and to cut expenses for independent development of arms.

For instance, this will allow Kazakhstan to develop space projects and maintain the Baikonur launching site. This will afford Belarus, who spends on destruction of weapons 1.6 times more than the USA, Britain and France taken together, cooperation with Russia in the disarmament process.

Nothing will prevent these countries from a closer bilateral cooperation, as is practiced in NATO. More than that, the defense community, supplemented by the already existing and prospective bilateral agreements (for instance, a Russia-Turkmen agreement on joint control of forces deployed there), will have a positive effect also on other CIS countries which are not its members.

The West too may turn out to be interested in creating a defense community in the CIS, because they are aware there of the necessity to have a partner in neutralizing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, settling local conflicts, including actions under the UN aegis and mandate, and lastly, for keeping the momentum of the disarmament process.

All this does not mean that creation of a defense community has no negative aspects. Its member states will have to make great expenses which, given the huge gap between their economic capabilities, will have to be

assumed largely by Russia. Besides, this will require a considerable amount of organizational efforts, for which not all of them are prepared.

The building of this system will inevitably entail partial loss of sovereignty. Some countries, for instance Belarus, will have to revise their attitude to collective security. It seems, however, that gains by far exceed losses: Common security is worth unity.

#### The Ethiopian and Spanish Lessons

Talking about creation of a defense community, one must remember lessons of the past.

First of all, the principle of "the world's indivisibility," proclaimed, but not observed, in the 1930s. It's an obvious fact that security can be only collective and that forgetfulness of this principle in the cases of aggression against Ethiopia, Manchuria and Spain led to tragic consequences. Therefore, perplexing is the position taken by Belarus who endeavors to justify her refusal to participate in peacemaking operations, referring to the absence of "global" interests, as if the stream of drugs won't inevitably sweep over her territory too, in case the Tajik-Afghan border falls.

Secondly, the conclusion of agreements on collective security must be supplemented by a military convention (or bilateral conventions), to prevent the unexpected emergence of insoluble problems. The failure to help Czechoslovakia during the Sudeten crisis because of the position taken by France may be quoted as an example.

Thirdly, and most importantly, history knows of no effective collective security system. And there are hardly grounds to believe that it will appear now, especially not on a global but regional level, considering at least the fact that national security interests of various countries are objectively different.

Quite a different thing is organization is collective security against a concrete challenge. NATO, which didn't lose viability even after the disappearance of its "Eastern adversary," is an organization of precisely this type. As compared with "security," "defense" is a narrower and more pragmatic concept, but this is what makes it more acceptable at the moment.

Implementation of the Taskhent Treaty will require creation of an organization.

There are at least four questions, the answers to which will to a great extent determine its future. Firstly, whom will it be aimed against? At present, there is no concrete adversary similar to that which the Warsaw Pact once had, while on the other hand, all-around defense is hardly realistic either. Secondly, will this organization become a military and political or political and military one? Thirdly, will this defense alliance become a means of influencing weaker members by the strongest state or, on the contrary, will the control bodies of this community make it possible for its less powerful partners to

exert influence on Russia? Fourthly, will the defense community serve primarily the interests of its member states or will the interests of the community as a whole be given priority? Naturally, so far there are no answers to these questions, and they will appear only in the course of building this organization.

#### **To Combine the Experience of Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact**

Contemporary history knows only two types of collective security alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The Warsaw Pact example is unsuitable: The dictate of the strongest state will be hardly accepted by other countries "with understanding." However, blindly following the example set by NATO is inexpedient either. First of all, at present the CIS countries are simply unable to create integrated military structures similar to NATO's, with their "national" assignment of positions. For instance, it's hardly possible to imagine an army corps permanently commanded by a Russian, with a Kazakh as the Chief of Staff and Armenians and Uzbeks as field commanders.

No less difficult it is to realize the necessity to create the NATO organizational pyramid—dozens of headquarters, departments, sections, groups and commissions—without spending years on studying the NATO experience and accumulation of our own, in countries where few practical workers have an idea of the difference between the NATO Military Committee and the Military Planning Committee.

It's hardly desirable to see in the CIS defense community various options of membership which are possible in NATO. (France, being a NATO member, rejects membership in its military organization). It seems that in the present conditions, this would weaken the consolidation of the community.

Evidently, it will be necessary to combine the experience of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It's expedient to keep national contingents (leaving chances for creation of some integrated groups of troops and task forces in the future), but with common plans of their operative use, a General Command and General Staff of the Joint Military Force, and possibly, with a Nuclear Planning Committee.

The main thing to be borrowed from NATO is the mechanism of political consultations which creates a democratic framework for decision making. It could be useful also to set up a Council of Defense Ministers and a Council of Foreign Ministers to meet regularly, and to conduct conferences of the leaders of member states, completely devoted to discussions of problems of military cooperation.

Decision must be made on a consensus basis, at least in order to avoid mutual suspicion. And if this turns out to be impossible for some reason or other, member states must retain the right to act on their own authority or on behalf of a group of member states of the community.

Of course, Russia can try to rely on her own strength, but this will be tantamount to rejection of the idea of the CIS. This choice will complicate the carrying out of military reforms in Russia, and in the long run it will result in the necessity for her to build strongholds, along the whole thousands-of-kilometers-long Russian state border.

### **RUSSIA: DEFENSE INDUSTRY**

#### **Problems of Russian Conversion Observed**

93UM0841A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
13 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "From the Pages of the Western Press": "Weapons For... Conversion"]

[Text] *Today's conversion of the military-industrial complex [VPK] in the countries of the former USSR is more reminiscent of a convulsion. At a time when production volumes are dropping catastrophically, some enterprises in the Russian VPK are not even trying their hand at manufacturing children's cradles or something similar, but are rather returning anew to what they know best—the production of arms. And the enterprises, notwithstanding that, are running into a host of difficulties all the same.*

What are the reasons?

The American newspaper [as published] U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT published an article devoted to the problems of Russian conversion. The article noted that there are new indications that Russia, under conditions of the wallowing of numerous enterprises not accustomed to the market, are more and more often setting their hopes on an expansion of arms exports as a life preserver. The hopes that Western investors would dare to invest funds in the weak Russian firms, after all, have pretty much burst. State credits have already been exhausted, even though the new prime minister of Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, undertook to support industrial production. So, better to get down to the old and already familiar—weapons.

Not long ago, as the newspaper emphasized, Russia announced the delivery of weapons in the amount of 2.2 billion dollars to China, India, Syria, Iran and other countries. Minister of Defense of Russia Pavel Grachev visited the United Arab Emirates with the aim of concluding an agreement on the sale of Russian air-defense systems, military aircraft and other supplies. Even if one allows that the flow of export weapons will increase, that gives only a portion of the funds required to finance the conversion efforts of Russia. According to specialists, the best case scenario will allow Russia to sell weapons of just 10 billion rubles a year, while it needs financing in the amount of 150 billion rubles.

And these are only the optimistic forecasts. According to the assertions of the American military, not a single MiG-29 fighter was sold last year despite the "dumping" prices. The lack of experience in Russia in the sale of weapons on a market-competitive, commercial basis is complicating matters. A number of the intermediaries, including a well-known Russian singer, suddenly halted the matter by demanding commissions in the concluding stages of the recent negotiations on the sale of 30 MiG-29s to Malaysia (an agreement of a little less than 800 million dollars was being planned).

But aside from such incompetence and difficulties in connection with the stipulation of guarantee terms for the supply of hardware, maintenance and other matters, there are more vital problems with which the survival of the enterprises being converted is connected. And here we should turn to the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in order to understand why it is so difficult for Russia to break through to the "shelves" on which the arms are traded.

One of the principal reasons is the fact that the defense industry of Russia has hundreds of industrial or scientific-industrial associations and thousands of enterprises. None of them, however, controls the entire production cycle, but rather provides a single area of it. (This is very typical of the Ukrainian VPK as well, by the way.) These enterprises are thus unable to compete with analogous foreign companies when being integrated into the world market, where all stages of a complex and scientifically sophisticated product are always concentrated at one firm. That is why the Russian VPK, regardless of the dumping prices, has not been able to provide for a significant amount of military production. A potential buyer, forced to contact several Russian organizations, as a rule ultimately decides to pay more and deal with one Western firm that ordinarily provides "turn-key" service.

The narrow specialization of Russian—as well as Ukrainian—defense enterprises cannot guarantee their financial reliability under market conditions. Insignificant changes in demand, conversion, the commodity intervention of foreign producers—all of this could easily push the enterprises of the VPK to the brink of bankruptcy. The state subsidies reduce that risk for now, but what will happen tomorrow?

And there is one more important detail. We have been convinced for a long time that our enterprises in the defense industry have been operating at the level of international standards. Analysis by a Russian scientific-research institute, however, refutes that thesis. Labor productivity in the Soviet aviation industry was 5.5 times lower than that of the American. Only a third of this lag, however, can be explained by technological backwardness. The other two thirds are explained by the poor leadership of those defense giants. Whereas in the West, for example, a large enterprise is considered to be one at which 500—1,000 people work, here there are some individual shops where that many people work.

Need we thus be surprised that it is very difficult to uphold Western standards and requirements with such sluggishness?

By the way, these are only a few of the elements that relate to the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. There are clearly considerably more of them. All the more so as the switching of military industry onto civilian tracks is creating problems even for the Western economies, with their mobile potential and sound financial institutions. The matter of conversion in Russia is a hundred times more complicated since economic reforms there have only just begun. It is thus necessary to take a detailed look at conversion Russian-style, remembering our own, sometimes analogous, conversion problems.

### **Finnish Firms Helping St. Petersburg Plants With Conversion**

*93UM0805A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Aug 93 p 2*

[Guest commentary by Jukka Tuominen, managing director of Otaniemi Technology Center, Inc.: "Silicon Valleys of Otaniemi and St. Petersburg Collaborating"—first paragraph is HELSINGIN SANOMAT introduction]

[Text] The munitions industry of the St. Petersburg area is being converted to peaceful uses. A partner has been found in Otaniemi to develop products marketable in a market economy. The prospects for collaboration during the initial phase are promising for both partners.

What do Finnish firms have to offer the Russians in joint ventures of the silicon valleys of both countries?

Do Finns have some special skill that is in demand in just this situation?

Can small and medium-sized Finnish companies offer Russian markets competitive solutions?

These are the most important questions that have arisen in considering cooperation between the Otaniemi Technology Park and the Baltic International Technopark (BIT) technology center founded in St. Petersburg.

The details of their collaboration were agreed on in May and it will be practically implemented as soon as this month. At that time two BIT representatives will arrive in Otaniemi. They will go into Finnish business promotion activities and establish contacts with companies and government officials.

### **New Role Opening Up to Finland**

The Otaniemi technology concentration and St. Petersburg's many research institutes will in fact form the focal point of development of the entire Baltic area's technology sector. On both sides of the border they have come to realize that contributions made to technology research are the only solid basis for reindustrialization.

Both nations sorely need it to cope with the competition for a standard of living in the world.

Cooperation benefiting both of them is based, on the one hand, on the fact that the Finns need the markets and subcontracting potential of the St. Petersburg area. The St. Petersburgers, on the other hand, need product development know-how and flexible production opportunities.

Within the framework of the agreed-on cooperation, the Finns will help to create small and medium-sized, technology-based businesses in St. Petersburg. The St. Petersburgers will supply Finnish companies with high-tech product blanks and subcontract jobs.

The prospects are attractive. An entirely new kind of role is opening up to Finns in the field of technological collaboration between the two countries: As a partner in collaboration, we will be able to follow from a key position the conversion of the Russian high-tech munitions industry into a developer and producer of peaceful products.

The change has been taking place at a surprisingly rapid pace in the field of cooperation on nuclear products in St. Petersburg. According to sources in St. Petersburg, the munitions industry used to account for 80 percent of production as against the present 30 percent. The next phase will be to develop successful products through new forms of production in a market economy. The development of new products will probably also be in those sectors in which Finnish firms have something to offer.

#### **Disco Light Shows Out of Missile Destroyers**

Of particular interest, for example, are the peaceful applications of military lasers. Tame versions of them with which even—say—light shows can be presented have been developed using the basic technology of former missile destroyers.

During Otaniemi representatives' first visit to St. Petersburg at the end of June, our partners in cooperation spoke of problems for which Finnish firms probably have ready-made solutions.

A laser device the size of a portable radio that flashes electronically to the beat of the music had been developed by the BIT laser department, a device that has already attracted attention at Western fairs. The problem is the production of a case of sufficiently good quality and adjusting controls at prices that are competitive on world markets.

We may talk of a real cultural revolution: Whereas stars constituted a headache for technology officers in wartime in connection with the destruction of enemy missiles, today they have to rack their brains to come up with a plastic case for their new product.

#### **Smart Materials Change Their Shape on Command**

Could the Finnish electrical supply industry, for example, provide them with efficient, practical solutions?

The difference between the practical problems and the dizzying technological prospects is mind-boggling. An example of this is a smart material developed by Russian scientists that can change its shape on command. The objective is to create parts that can be—say—balls or cubes on command, as needed.

The knowledge of materials acquired under difficult circumstances through space technology has given the Russians a good practical feel for the behavior of materials under conditions in which the effects of extreme cold and solar radiation may produce variations in temperature on the surface of the same part of as great as hundreds of degrees.

There are innovations in military technology products the details of which they naturally still do not want to reveal to everyone. We can get an idea of their nature when we compare the properties of Russian and Western fighter aircraft—there has to be something exceptional about a plane if it can be built under considerably more modest circumstances at at least the same level of complexity as that achieved by comparable Western competitors.

#### **Uusimaa Provincial Government Subsidizes Cooperation**

Finnish-Russian silicon valley collaboration is to be developed as a neighboring area project in which Uniscience, Ltd., owned by Finland's universities, and the Otaniemi Technology Park will participate. The Uusimaa provincial government will be subsidizing the project.

Operational data communications links are necessary as an indispensable tool. There are already fiber-optic cable links between St. Petersburg and Finland for telephone calls and fax transmissions. Electronic mail is still best transmitted over links organized by U.S. companies.

Contacts at the level of the individual, which are, when all is said and done, the most important ones, will be made through improvement of communications and personal meetings, once confidential cooperation is established at the company level.

#### **Presidential Adviser Discusses Military-Industrial Reform**

93UM0814A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 27 Aug 93 pp 1, 5

[Article by Mikhail Maley: "Reform of the Military-Industrial Complex: So Far the Government Does Not Know How To Conduct It"]

[Text] The USSR military-industrial complex occupied a major position in the "Soviet mythology" of the West.



Based on President Eisenhower's well-known comment, Sovietologists, political scientists, and other specialists of the United States, Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Japan frightened the world and themselves with the idea of the omnipotence of the military-industrial complex in the USSR. At that time few specialists paid any attention to the fundamental differences between the military-industrial complex of the USSR and the military-industrial complex of the United States. During the process of M.S. Gorbachev's perestroika and B.N. Yeltsin's reforms after the August putsch it became quite obvious that in the USSR there had never been either a powerful military complex or a powerful industrial complex or a military-industrial complex as Eisenhower conceived of it. In reality there was the party complex at the level of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which always made decisions of both a military and an industrial nature. No assembly of directors of defense enterprises had ever decided the fate of one member of the Politburo or another. And no assembly of officers or generals had ever carried out such tasks either. On the contrary, the fate of the leaders of the defense industry and army was not even decided by members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo but by Central Committee workers of a much lower rank. The Western myth about the USSR military-industrial complex was transferred to the consciousness of many political figures of Russia and rendered a most harmful influence on the course of political processes.

The "military-industrial complex syndrome" made it impossible for the Yeltsin administration to promptly take advantage of the political and economic power of the leaders of the defense industry of Russia, shifted the objectives in the struggle for the power base, and impeded the inclusion of the defense industry in the reforms. The extremely exaggerated idea of the "power of the military-industrial complex" and its hostility to the idea of reforms became the basis of the Gaydar government's orientation toward actually eliminating the large defense industry instead of using it as an instrument of reform. The unspoken indication of the high leaders was embraced by employees from the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation and even the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The economic blow to the defense industry was dealt with extreme resoluteness and force. The mythical powerful military-industrial complex was to have collapsed and left behind a multitude of small, demoralized fragments—construction material for total conversion in industry.

In reality this did not happen. The Gaydar government made its next mistake. The defense industry complex of 5 million people, disciplined and able to work under extreme conditions, withstood the blow, overcame its own psychological complex in 1992, began to rapidly restructure itself, and even supported the president of the Russian Federation in the referendum. Thus, because of its incorrect assessment of the initial information, the Gaydar government lost a strategic ally. And

the senseless actions during 1992 in the so-called conversion of the military-industrial complex produced no result either, other than the assimilation of budget funds. G. Khizha's departure from the post of deputy prime minister completed the first stage in the relations between the government and the defense industry of Russia.

During the first period of the reforms the Russian Academy of Sciences was preoccupied with a strange illusion regarding the defense industry. For many decades, in keeping with the generally accepted schema, the latest achievements of academic science were utilized in the defense industry. The Academy was paid generously for the work it did. In this respect the USSR was no different from the United States, Germany, or France.

But at the time of the blow to the defense industry not one academician, not to mention the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences as a whole, made any resolute clarification for the government as to what the defense industry and its applied science are or that it is impossible to attribute to defense industry incomes the gigantic expenditures made by the army on the creation of strategic launching facilities, a submarine fleet, and underground cities.

Somewhat later, this position of the Russian Academy of Sciences ended up as an attack on academic science itself. The "reform government" in 1992 had not found a place for Russian academic science in its schematic economy. The Academy was unmercifully cast "into the market" without any point of reference. One can only assume that the Russian Academy of Sciences was treated with the same approach as the military-industrial complex—break the system into fragments to be used by somebody else.

The Soviet trade unions, which functioned for years as a "school of communism," considerably demoralized by "perestroika," showed no signs of protest at the time of the attack on the military-industrial complex either. The traditional obedience to decisions from above made it possible to make wages in the military-industrial complex the lowest, and made it possible to send workers, engineers, scientists, men, and women on forced leave for months without being concerned about how they were going to live. Nobody objected to the "clearing off" of children's institutions, polyclinics, hospitals, and schools from the balance sheets of defense enterprises. Somewhat later the branch trade unions of the defense industry themselves "got the axe" and were absolutely ignored by the authorities. Unfortunately, not only Ye.T. Gaydar but also V.S. Chernomyrdin for months were unable to find an hour or two to meet with the leaders of the branch trade unions. With their cautious attitude toward the military-industrial complex this position on the part of the government reminds one of an ostrich. As a result they missed the time for a number of social measures, and in many regions a prestrike condition was

declared at enterprises of the military-industrial complex. And the inclusion of the peaceful and disciplined military-industrial complex in the strike movement and the political struggle will undoubtedly lead to the "last straw" for the ruling administration.

Unfortunately, under the real conditions of 1992-1993 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation paid practically no attention to the military-industrial complex either. The RSFSR law that was adopted "On Conversion" quickly became outdated under the torrent of presidential edicts for developing the reforms. Budget funds officially allotted for conversion either did not reach the enterprises at all or arrived two to four months late. In essence, the law on conversion made it possible for many commercial banks serving enterprises of the military-industrial complex to "make" large amounts of money for themselves. The situation largely reminded one of Mr. Koreyko's well-known activity for building a factory. Nor did the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, despite a multitude of appeals, find time to impose order in the banking activity under its jurisdiction or to closely monitor the execution of the law. And the actions of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Industry and Energy alone, under the conditions of the confrontation of powers, could not produce any appreciable effect.

Thus during the economic reform the state and social structure "above" the military-industrial complex did practically nothing to organize controlled reform of this complex, to solve social problems, or to realize its scientific and technical potential. In the absence of a federal ideology for the reform of the military-industrial complex, random conversion and structural rearrangement of the defense industry is once again dealing a blow to people's destinies and their standard of living.

Considerable expectations on the part of the detachment of many millions of workers of the military-industrial complex were linked to the coming of V.S. Chernomyrdin. There was the hope that the renewed government would at least somewhat improve the work of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation regarding questions of administration and service for the military-industrial complex, and would allocate that "skeleton" of scientific research institutes, design bureaus, and plants which is vitally necessary to Russia and which should be preserved at any price.

It can now be stated with confidence that the declared sequence in the work of the Gaydar government was realized in the worst way for the military-industrial complex.

During the first half of 1993 the defense industry had no long-term orders for its products. As before, it was impossible to plan scientific research and experimental design work for complex systems—Mr. A.A. Kokoshin from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation could not

plan beyond one year. Conversely, the debts of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation grew sharply. If defense enterprises of Russia had responded to V.S. Chernomyrdin's appeal to file charges against those who do not pay their bills, the minister of defense of the Russian Federation would never have gotten out of the court rooms. In the complex cooperation among Ukrainian, Belarus, and other CIS states, because of the failure to solve problems of settlements and the introduction of national currencies with no quoted ruble equivalents, many orders were lost, including those for export goods. Exports of spare parts and replacement parts and items were almost complete failures with respect to both deadlines and volumes. Export deliveries caused the greatest harm to India. In spite of the readiness of practically all defense enterprises to fulfill any state order, to work on three shifts without holidays or days off, and for half the world price in dollars with equal quality, nobody in the Russian federal government was interested in offers to replace imports. And, after all, Russia's foreign currency expenditures just on the acquisition of spare parts for all branches amount to several billion dollars a year. Instead of giving the work to its own citizens, to its own industry, the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation are financing Western industry with enviable alacrity. Transferring the money from industrial imports alone to the military-industrial complex, even with a markdown of 50 percent off the world price, would have solved a large share of the social and production problems of the military-industrial complex of Russia.

On the whole during the second half of 1993 in defense branches of industry, including the nuclear industry, there will be a critical aggravation of economic contradictions. A continuing passive attitude toward the needs of the military-industrial complex presents a real threat to B.N. Yeltsin's regime and to the entire state economy as well. The time has come for decisions. What should these decisions be?

It seems logical that the affairs of most of machine building, specialized chemistry, and the nuclear industry, which determine the fate of the reform and produce several billions of dollars a year in cash foreign currency, should have a separate deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and it would be even better to have a first deputy. It seems extremely necessary for him to find time to speak not only with the general designers of the most important weapons systems but also with the leaders of the less important defense enterprises, the trade unions, the press, regional administrations, and colleagues in the United States and NATO.

It seems logical for the leader of the Russian committee of defense branches of industry, far from the least important figure in Russia, to be a member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of Russia, so that he would be informed about the necessary participation of the military-industrial complex in the reform and the higher leaders would listen to him. It seems expedient under the conditions of a confrontation of powers for the

Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation for Scientific and Technical Questions of the Defense Industry formed by the president of the Russian Federation to be the real coordinator of the efforts of all state branches of power for reforming the defense industry of Russia.

These organizational measures must be taken immediately. It might already be too late.

Among the other tasks in restructuring the military-industrial complex one must include changing the ideology and terminology. It is impossible to "preserve" the military-industrial complex. This is an impossible economic task. And also to preserve it would mean to hang on to what has already been achieved. The leading role of the military-industrial complex in the overall reform makes it necessary not to preserve the complex but to reform its structure. In this connection the term "conversion" cannot be used universally since the task of reforming the military-industrial complex also requires solutions to problems of technical re-equipment of the Russian Armed Forces. Within the framework of the reform of the military-industrial complex the entire complex must be oriented toward a postcrisis starting point, an export starting point. And the export assignments of the military-industrial complex must be ranked—exports to CIS countries and competition with the industry of these states throughout the entire nomenclature of the industry for civilian and military products, exports to the Baltics in order to preserve and expand the market for Russian products for civilian purposes, exports to the former CEMA countries—for all kinds of products; exports to markets of traditional Third World partners—for their national currencies, through barter, and for Russian property in these countries; exports to markets of developed countries of Europe, the United States, and Japan—under conditions of state support, both economic and political. On the whole it is necessary to set an export assignment for each state enterprise as well as nonstate partnerships and companies for industrial exports. With the ruble exchange rate that has developed, the Russian defense industry is economically out of the competition in any market. But when it comes to questions of the quality of the exported product, it is necessary to apply completely the technology for producing products for military purposes which we know so well.

Cadres play an important role in the reform of the military-industrial complex. It is necessary at both the regional and federal levels to organize a record of cadre specialists with the creation of a computer cadre data bank for the military-industrial complex of Russia. All scientists, engineers, designers, and highly skilled foremen and workers (or former workers) at enterprises of the defense and nuclear industry must be subject to voluntary cadre registration. Solving the problem of keeping track of personnel in the military-industrial complex will make it possible to staff the "ground-breaking" scientific production complexes with the necessary cadres and also determine ahead of time the cost

of measures for creating the proper living conditions for these cadres. There was a time when the slogan "personnel decide everything" was not Japanese. It is time to return this slogan to Russia and above all to the military-industrial complex of Russia. Within the military-industrial complex this work can be carried out quite successfully with the resources of existing branch information-economics institutes: the All-Union Institute of Interbranch Information, and also the corresponding subdivisions at the enterprises. The work should be financed according to the item of conversion.

Taking into account the regime of secrecy that existed before, even regarding the trauma and changes that came after the collapse of the USSR, it is impossible to begin to reform the military-industrial complex without a careful reassessment of production capacities, the coefficient of their loading, their autonomy, their dependency on cooperation with enterprises of the CIS countries, the availability of raw and processed materials, and the stability of transportation lines and channels. At the present time there is the possibility of having a computer data bank of production capacities of the military-industrial complex in Russia which is updated on the spot during the course of privatization, conversion, and the creation of new enterprises. This mandatory work could be conducted by the Russian Committee of Defense Branches of Industry and the Ministry of Atomic Energy in conjunction with the Councils of Ministers of the republics and the administrations of the krais and oblasts of Russia. Regional cadre and production data banks of the military-industrial complex will help local administrations to manage their economic regions and maneuver resources.

After the aforementioned measures for accounting for and determining the starting positions in the reform of the military-industrial complex, on the basis of the foreign political and military doctrine of Russia, throughout the entire structure of the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation it is necessary to draw up a "skeleton of the military-industrial complex of Russia"—a list of the state, semistate, and private organizations, companies, and enterprises, which are *absolutely necessary* for the existence of the defense and nuclear industry of Russia. This so-called "critical list" must correspond to the list of "critical technologies" which a great power must master. The list of critical technologies in the military-industrial complex must again be considered by the government as a guide for modernizing existing capacities, and full budget allocations must be provided for the "critical technologies." It would be expedient to leave the initial "critical list of enterprises" open to competition for the possible requirement of non-competitive organizations carrying out state programs.

The reform of the military-industrial complex in Russia in principle can be carried out according to two plans—autonomously or in cooperation with the CIS countries. An autonomous reform which obviously makes Russia absolutely independent of the outside world with respect to



the entire nomenclature of military equipment is unacceptable in spite of all its political attractiveness.

*In the first place*, the autonomous plan requires a great deal of time for the creation of the necessary scientific and technical centers and new production capacities. *In the second place*, this plan requires very large expenditures, which would weaken the budget even more and would eliminate the possibility of concentrating available budget funds on "critical technologies." *In the third place*, our CIS neighbors would be forced to accept foreign military equipment and technology, which would not increase the security of the Russian borders.

At the same time the "cooperative" reform of the military-industrial complexes of the CIS countries requires immediately beginning active negotiations, applying a unified plan of reform, and adopting the corresponding legislative and administrative documents.

If the Chernomyrdin government drags its feet in preparing for and conducting the "cooperative" reform of the military-industrial complex, all the material and psychological impact related to it will have to be charged to specific individuals.

On the organizational plane it seems expedient to form a Council of Ministers of the CIS for Questions of the Defense Industry, transnational conversion programs, transnational joint-stock companies for producing military equipment, international (in the CIS) banks of the military-industrial complex, and large insurance companies. It would be necessary to request that Russian capitalists interested in participating in affairs of the military-industrial complex take charge of the organization of the international-CIS private capital for use at combined enterprises.

In the second stage of the "cooperative" reform of the military-industrial complex it would be expedient to restore possible military-technical cooperation with former CEMA countries.

It is quite understandable that reform of the military-industrial complex of Russia is impossible without the creation of modern market structures. It is necessary to support and strengthen the business center that has been created for the military-industrial complex, to complete registration of the military-industrial bank that has been created, and integrate all banks of the military-industrial complex into a single financial company (the Reskomoboronprom plan), to found a Russian Military-Industrial Insurance Company, and to integrate all information-economic institutions of branches of the military-industrial complex into a unified joint-stock information concern of the military-industrial complex. The creation of the aforementioned structures will make it possible to have a reform mechanism and will connect the military-industrial complex with the country's market economy. It would seem expedient to create similar structures for other CIS countries as well.

One of the mechanisms for implementing the reform of the military-industrial complex is the smooth operation of the numerous departmental and interdepartmental commission for affairs of the defense industry. The working contradictions among such commissions have a result that is useful to the country since they make it possible to extrapolate the statewide purpose and advantage from departmental interests. The Interbranch Defense Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation with its scientific and technical council should be the place where this purpose and this advantage are disclosed.

The entire reform of the military-industrial complex would be doomed to failure if we did not manage to create a new market system of material and technical supply. Moreover for the military-industrial complex, in addition to the existing exchange and other possibilities of the civilian market, it is necessary to create several special exchanges, probably international (CIS), for materials and items with restricted distribution. The system for selling prepared products must be fundamentally updated. The "dried up" Ministry of Defense of Russia does not have the right to "dry out" the Russian defense industry to make it fit its own budget. Military equipment is an export commodity. The Russian military-industrial complex is quite capable of filling the orders not only of India and Turkey but of entire continents. With observance of the UN rules, "arms" money sounds good to the foundering economy of Russia.

A special place in the reform of the military-industrial complex is occupied by relations between branches of Roskomoboronprom and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the "power" bloc, on the other—the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. The attempt to "unilaterally" determine the future military and technical level of the Russian Armed Forces and "unilaterally" and unsupervised distribute budget funds for the scientific and technical development of military equipment is a profound mistake. This kind of "militarization" of relations is dangerous to society and the authorities and is economically harmful—far from all the Russian scientists, analysts, and organizers are gathered in the collegiums of these departments. The Army must have what it needs to perform its own, *military*, function, and nothing else. Pity the country where the generals allow soldiers to die on the border because they were engaged in trade projects at the time. One of the conditions for the reform of the military-industrial complex is to release defense science and industry from the "deadly" grip of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation are quite capable of providing the necessary supervision of "correct" behavior on the part of the defense industry.

There is no doubt that the aforementioned tasks do not exhaust the diversity of directions of the reform of the military-industrial complex. It is necessary to develop a flexible plan and structure for administration of the reform, which must be based on the interests of the enterprises, republics, krais, and oblasts, taking into account the interests of our neighbors in the CIS.

We must begin the reform today. Fortunately, there will apparently be no political opposition to this reform.

#### **Ammunition Production, Latest Products From Klimovsk**

93UM0831 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Sep 93 p. 7

[Article by Viktor Litovkin of IZVESTIYA under the rubric "New Weapons of Russia": "Cartridges for Snipers and Champions"]

[Text] Our newspaper has already talked about the unique items from the Klimovsk Central Scientific-Research Institute of Precision Machine Building (TsNIItochmash) more than once (IZVESTIYA Nos. 78 and 87). They deserve it. There are, after all, no longer any such noiseless pistols, automatic weapons or grenade launchers, weapons for underwater fighting and other special rifles and revolvers anywhere in the world.

Our story today is about the ammunition for this weaponry. No sniper, enlisted man or sportsman dreaming of being a champion can have a well-aimed shot without it.

I do not mention champions in competitive shooting by accident. All of the members of the former all-star team of the Union, today Russia and the other countries of the CIS, and world and Olympic champions fire cartridges developed at TsNIItochmash. These are the Olimp, Temp and Biatlon 5.6mm ring-igniting rifle cartridges, the same caliber pistol ammunition, 4.5mm cartridges for the Sport air rifle and Ekstra and Chelp 7.62mm live rifle and pistol ammunition.

They surpass the best foreign analogues—the German Match, .32 Smith and Wesson and P-25, the British Tenex, the Swedish Norma, the Finnish Dominator and Lapua-Biatlon—first and foremost in the grouping of shots. The greatest dispersion of the Olimp-BI at a range of 50 meters, for example, is just 9–15 mm in cross section. It is 20–25 mm for the Finnish Lapua-Biatlon. The Olimp-25 pistol has a dispersion of 16–21 mm at a range of 25 meters, and the German P-25 30–35 mm.

A millimeter of difference in a sporting duel costs not only medals, but even the fate of the champion. But in a real battle it can cost life.

The chief of the cartridge department at TsNIItochmash, Igor Berezkin, told me that they had achieved such precision with their products through new process equipment created at the institute itself for the series manufacture of bullets and the filling of the cartridges, as well

as the assimilation of unique small-grain powders, special primer caps for the cartridges and thermally stable ballistic lubricants.

I saw how these cartridges are made. Their cartridge cases are rolled with a precision of hundredths of a millimeter, the powder for each is weighed to a precision of a thousandth of a gram, the bullets of half a gram are stamped and then greased so that they do not become lead-clad in firing and so that the barrel of the rifle or pistol does not jam.

It is interesting that a woman—Anna Grigoryevna Baturina—was the developer of the Olimp-BI and Biatlon championship 5.6mm rifle cartridges. She has been working at the TsNII for 43 years now, and receives 25,000 a month. They say that she would be unable to feed her loved ones on that money without a garden.

Close relatives of many of the associates of the cartridge shop work at the institute, in its shops and labs. We noticed that women, by the way, are the principal individuals active in cartridge production at TsNIItochmash. Among the designers of lubricants and primer caps are S. Ivanova, V. Vukolova and L. Novozhilova, and among the developers of cartridges are K. Makarova, L. Pestova, A. Gaydukova, V. Andreyeva, N. Tereshchenko and S. Kasyanova. Readers of IZVESTIYA are familiar with that last name—she is the wife of Ivan Kasyanov, one of the creators of cartridges for underwater weapons.

Family relationships are in general a characteristic trait of workers in the defense sector. For many reasons. Owing to the secrecy as well. A fitter/adjuster in the shop where they make the live cartridges for automatic weapons, carbines and pistols, Ivan Gaydukov, for example, came to the institute during the war, in 1942, when the Germans were still near Moscow. He was 13 years old at the time. All of the cartridges, from the 5.45mm to shells for the 23mm automatic aviation cannon, have passed through his hands. Ivan Tikhonovich now makes 7.62mm cartridges for the SKS carbine and the Sayga hunting rifle, which are put out in Izhevsk based on the Kalashnikov automatic rifle.

The bullet for it is outwardly the same, but its envelope is bimetallic, with a steel core and a slightly clipped head. It can hit an elk or boar outright from three hundred meters. His wife, daughter—a design engineer—and son-in-law work here at the institute. The daughter of underwater weaponry designers Yelena and Vladimir Simonov, Natasha Masilevich, is herself a designer of an assault firing knife, and also works here. As well as her husband.

And where can you work in Klimovsk if all four of its enterprises are for the defense industry through and through, which is not going through the best of times?

Today no one is financing the output of the sport ammunition that has already set some 40 world records and won 200 gold medals in world championships and

the Olympic Games. The principal centers for the training of the masters of target shooting—Sukhumi, Lvov, Minsk—are all abroad. Production would be halted entirely if it were not for the export of Olimp ammunition. But no one can say how long it will continue.

Our shooters were without their former shine at the last European championships and lost, it is true, but that had nothing to do with the people of TsNIITochmash.

### Financing for TsNIITochMASH Dries Up

93UM0821B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Sep 93 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Yegorov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "TsNIITochMASH Is Not Sending out an SOS. But It Is No Longer Promising Priorities"]

[Text] It is known for certain:

*...The American soldiers who fought in Vietnam gladly parted with their M-16 automatic rifle if they had the opportunity to arm themselves with a captured AK-47.*

*...In Afghanistan, the mujahedin fought completely with Kalashnikov assault rifles, and not because they had no funds for other weapons.*

*During Desert Storm, soldiers of the Multinational Forces did not turn over captured Iraqi assault rifles to the depots.*

*The reliability of the "Kalashnikov" is legendary.*

Anatoliy Deryagin, deputy chief engineer at the Central Scientific Research Institute of Precision Machine Building (TSNIITochMASH) and director of the line for small arms, tells about the comparative tests of the latest modification of the M-16 and our AK-74.

The two models of weapons were passed through the "crematorium," although, of course, they were not limited to just "roasting." The testing program was extensive. So, +50 degrees is nothing; -50 degrees is much more serious. Then the assault rifle, ringing with frost, was thrust into the heat; it was covered with frost and drops of moisture, and then immediately returned to the frozen chamber. Next it is subjected to five days of intensive operation without cleaning. It is dropped from a height to concrete. It gets dust on it. A special device applies a layer of dust of a special concentration for 20 minutes; after this, it is fired and again put under dust for 20 minutes. Then it is cleaned, freshly lubricated, goes through dust again, shower, dust... After each stage, a specific amount of ammunition is fired off.

The AK-74 fired. The M-16 had a malfunction, unable to make it through half of the tests.

However, in rejoicing over the successes of the domestic gun smiths and feeling a sense of pride for the undisputed leadership in this area, it must not be forgotten

that this distinction is not a gift of fate, but the result of painstaking and properly organized work of talented specialists. Remember: our soldiers entered the Great Patriotic War with a Mosin-Nagant service rifle over their shoulder. Of course, it was not because the military leadership interfered with the weapon designers. There simply were no good models. Hence the numerous types of small arms from the war times. These include the AVS automatic rifle, the SVT semiautomatic rifle, the PPD, PPSH, and PPS machine pistols... But already in the late 1940's, the single Kalashnikov assault rifle appeared in the Soviet Army, and modifications of it are "working" in the troops to this day.

This came about thanks to an idea that emerged in the middle of the war: combine efforts and create a center concentrating design thought, which could generalize and summarize accumulated experience and work out the directions of future development of weapons. In 1944, such a center was created in Klimovsk near Moscow. It was given the name NII-61. Strictly speaking, thanks to it we were also able to break away from our competitors in the area of small arms. (Incidentally, not only small arms. The institute's sphere of research with the passage of time extended to artillery, antitank guided missiles, and so forth.)

"We became a kind of arbitrator in the competition of design bureaus," says A. Deryagin, who has worked at the institute for just under 40 years. "We were involved exclusively in scientific research and comprehensive work on development and scientific and technical support of programs for developing one or another type of weapons for the years ahead. This was our primary task."

That is precisely why the specialists of the TSNIITochMASH, as the institute is now called, were often prohibited from "getting into" experimental design work, that is, from squandering time and effort on things that any other institute or design bureau could do.

Today there is virtually no assault rifle, machinegun, or pistol that does not relate to the Central Scientific Research Institute to some degree or another or has passed through the hands of its specialists. Comprehensive developments of cartridges and weapons were conducted only here. Cartridge development—as we know, the effectiveness of the weapon is 70 percent dependent on it—became a monopoly of the institute, and remains such to this day. The 7.62-mm cartridge for the Kalashnikov assault rifle and the 12.7-mm and 14.5-mm ammunition set the beginning for it. The State Prize was awarded to leading designer Lidiya Bulavskaya in 1974 for development of the 5.45 cartridge for the AK-74.

Recalling the "stagnant" years, all designers unanimously say today that that was a time of search, truly creative work, thanks to which elegant models with phenomenal characteristics could be placed on the table. These included a silent 7.62-mm pistol, 9-mm assault rifle, and sniper rifle. Incidentally, they also won the

State Prize (designers Ivan Kasyanov, Viktor Pet'ov, Petr Serdyukov, and Anatoliy Deryagin). Nikonov's "Abakan" assault rifle is one and a half to two times as effective as the AK-74.

The situation had changed fundamentally today. The institute has begun to be turned from a central scientific research institute into an ordinary sectorial institute, whose leadership is struggling with resolving the sole and primary task: to survive and preserve the institute and its very rich base. The main reason is the collapse of the financing system that was developed over the years.

At the time of the USSR, the institute was receiving funds from the Ministry of the Defense Industry. When it was abolished, the money earmarked for scientific research work immediately wandered into the pockets of several departments: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, and the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation. We know how full these purses are today. There are not enough funds even for paying wages. There is no money here for creative activity. The most curious work is being shut down, sometimes in the final stages. An example of that is a machinegun-rifle weapon system that is already in metal. Its characteristics are capable of surprising the most unflappable critic.

"In order somehow stay afloat," says chief engineer of the TSNITOChMASH Vladimir Ivanov, "we are forced to forget about scientific research and the future, and engage basically in experimental design work, the financing of which is ensured."

As of the beginning of the year, the institute's planned expenditures were 1,300 million rubles [R]. Contracts worth R1,650 million have been concluded for performing a wide variety of work (from motor vehicle safety belts to high-precision munitions). However, there cannot any talk about income due to the "thriving" inflation and the slow growth of wages. Relatively high for the sector (R44,000 in July), the wages cannot satisfy specialists of the institute for the simple reason that at nearby enterprises—battery and cable plants and a sewing machine plant—they are 3-4 times higher. Therefore, since 1989 the personnel losses have been nearly 50 percent. These are mainly young people and experienced specialists—under 40 years of age. You do not have to be a genius to understand that the TSNITOChMASH is dying. In 8-10 years there will be no one here to work.

There is no reason to ask if they understand this upstairs; they do. That is why the top chiefs are visiting the institute, including the first deputy minister of defense and the chairman of the Russian Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry. Alas, no start is seen towards the institute's main job—work for the future. Today they are preparing to produce gas pistols and developing a special pistol system for construction workers, pyrotechnic cutters, devices for crushing rocks, and sublimating plants for food industry workers. On a general-purpose

machine tool designed for "by-the-piece" jewelry work, they are "driving out" a series of their own developments for the Airborne Troops (a general-purpose erector-transporter modular system), hunting cartridges, and cartridges for Olympic sports shooting. In order to survive. In order somehow to support people. In order to last.

From the conversation with the director of the TSNITOChMASH, Aleksandr Khinikadze, it became clear that he no longer expects any real help from the state.

"Our investors—banks with their absurd interest rate of 170 percent—are making any activity infeasible," he says. "The only way out is to find patrons, wealthy people for whom love and pride in the motherland are not empty words."

With the help of patrons, Aleksandr Valeryanovich [Khinikadze] plans to build on the institute's territory a trade and exhibition center for small arms and cannon armament where it and also manufacturers could present their products for sale. He plans to equip the center with communications, build a conference hall, and so forth. With the help of patrons, Khinikadze plans to open a hunting weapons store.

But are these tasks really so backbreaking for our state?

In the United States, for example, the state finances enterprises that are called venture enterprises. These are enterprises engaging in risky research on the verge of science fiction. It is believed that if a success rate of one out of 100 is achieved in research, the costs will more than pay for themselves.

The TSNITOChMASH is not a venture enterprise. The results of its activities have brought and are bringing the country (and not just our country) billions in income. But the main thing is independence in the area of arms. So, the state is the institute's big debtor. However, having limited budget appropriations and not having legislatively secured the rights of the developer (the institute could have prospered just on the deductions from the sale of 5.45-mm cartridges), it continues to rob it, leaving no hope for the future.

Of course, the time will come to repay the debts. But it may happen that there will no one to repay them to.

#### **Difficulties with Obtaining New Markets for Aviation Industry**

93UM0821C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Sep 93 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Fedorovich Voynov, chief of the exhibition advertising department of the "Aviaeksport" Foreign Economic State Association, by Valentin Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "We Must Fight for New Markets, But It Is Still Important To Keep Those We Already Have"]



[Text] The work days at the air show are filled to the limit. Meetings, viewings of exhibits, demonstration flights, presentations, conferences... With all this going on, it seemed hopeless to catch Aleksandr Voynov, chief of the exhibit advertising department of the "Aviaeksport" Foreign Economic State Association, for an interview. But we still managed to do it. He agreed to answer questions for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

[Voynov] The sorest spot for "Aviaeksport" is not only winning new aviation markets but also keeping those we already had. In its more than 30-year history, "Aviaeksport" has delivered to 62 countries more than 6,000 aircraft and helicopters, the majority of which are in operation to this day.

[Rudenko] This was in the past, but how do things stand today? What amount of aviation equipment was exported last year?

[Voynov] This is a delicate figure, and I would not want to give it. I will merely say that it is not \$100 million.

As you know, today not only have state foreign trade organizations been given the right to export aviation equipment, but so have commercial structures and the enterprises themselves. Some of them, thinking about the immediate profit, are willing to sell our aircraft and helicopters to whomever they wish and as they wish. Unfortunately, at today's air show, too, there are cases in which equipment is being offered in one corner of the pavilion for one price and for a completely different price in another corner. Life harshly punishes for dumping prices. Western firms understand this well and prefer to work with reputable partners that know the market conditions, know how to follow a flexible price policy, and, most important, are able to ensure a guaranteed supply of spare parts for 15-20 years for the aircraft and helicopters sold.

[Rudenko] How much does our system of trade in aviation equipment correspond to world practice? Does Russia have a clearly defined strategy of aviation-technical cooperation?

[Voynov] It has such a strategy. It is based on the potential produced in past years. With our help, for example, an aviation industry has actually been created in India, and a splendid repair base has been created in Libya, Algeria, and Egypt. We have invested huge amounts of money in production of aircraft and helicopters in countries of Eastern Europe.

"Aviaeksport" today is able to ensure delivery of spare parts to any of the companies and firms cooperating with us within 48 hours, 72 hours, or 10 days, which conforms fully to world standards.

[Rudenko] Before, "Aviaeksport" offered exclusively civilian aircraft and helicopters on the world market. Why not use your experience for exporting combat aircraft?

[Voynov] In my view, the state should continue to be involved in deliveries of combat aircraft and helicopters through specialized foreign trade associations. As for supporting the operation of combat equipment sold and supplying spare parts, if you consider that "Aviaeksport" has set up commercial centers in 32 countries and has a network of warehouse complexes, we could take this on. The cause would only gain from this.

[Rudenko] On what terms is aviation equipment being exported to countries of Eastern Europe and to nearby foreign states?

[Voynov] As we know, the time of humanitarian deliveries of aviation equipment is long past. Although when concluding contracts we, of course, approach each specific case differentially. It would be an unforgivable mistake to lose our traditional markets in countries of Eastern Europe, Southeastern Asia, and other regions.

#### Izhevsk Civilian Product Advertisements

93UM0821A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Sep 93 p 7

[Advertisement: "Izhevsk Mechanical Plant State Enterprise"]

[Text]

#### "Companion-2M" and "Companion-2D" Personal Computers

Our Computers will become excellent "companions" for you when equipping game halls and youth centers, when performing engineering and production tasks, and also as teaching devices in schools.

Merits of the computers:

- large selection of diverse programs.
- software compatibility with the popular "ZX Spectrum" model of computers.
- printer driver for working with a printer.
- built-in BASIC programming language.
- built-in RGB-SECAM coder for connection to a TV antenna and video input ("Companion-2M" and "Companion-2M.01").
- expanded 88-key keyboard.
- buffered processor buses.
- disk-drive operation ("Companion-2D").
- can be equipped with built-in NGMD controller ("Companion-2M").
- capability of connecting AUZ-8912 music processor.

**IZh-105 Two-Cylinder, Two-Stroke, Carburetor, Air-Cooled Engine**

Is used as power-generating unit on "IZh-Yupiter" series motorcycles.

Technical Characteristics	
Number of cycles	2
Displacement volume, cm	347.6
Cylinder diameter, mm	6.2
Piston stroke, mm	57.6
Geometric compression ratio	9.3
Maximum effective power at 5000-10 percent RPM, kW (hp)	17.65 (24)
Maximum torque at 5000+3 percent RPM, Nm (kgf m)	34.82(3.55)
Control fuel consumption of motorcycle per 100 km at 75 percent maximum speed, liters	
without side trailer	5.9
with side trailer	7.0
Cooling	Air
Dimensions, mm (not over)	500x470x390
Weight, kg (not over)	46

**EKS-520 Implantable Multiprogrammable Electrocardiostimulator**

Designed for treating intermittent atrioventricular block of the heart, Morgagni-Adams-Stokes syndrome, and sinus node weakness syndrome with the aid of electrical atrioventricular stimulation.

**Features of the EKS-520:**

- used with endo- and myocardial electrodes with a glass-carbon or platinum tip;
- electrical power is supplied by a small lithium battery that provides the stimulator an average service life of up to 6 years;
- the casing is made of titanium alloy, making it possible to use it as an indifferent electrode throughout the period of service;
- the stimulator is programmed remotely using the magnetic field of the PROGREKS-04M programmer.

**Merits of the stimulator:**

- the broad spectrum enables the physician to treat the patient in accordance with his individual peculiarities;
- post-operative measurement of the stimulation threshold and programming the amplitude and duration of the stimulating pulse reduce the possibility of blocking the output;

—adjusting the sensitivity threshold decreases the danger of a false triggering;

—use of the hysteresis function makes it possible to optimize the daily effectiveness of the stimulator.

Technical Characteristics	
Stimulation frequency, impulses per minute:	
natural	30-150 (70)
control	100 ("magnetic test")
Parameters of stimulating impulse	
amplitude, V	2.5 (5)
duration, ms	0.25, 0.5, (0.75), 1.0
Sensitivity threshold, mV:	
kR-wave	1.5-4.5
kP-wave	0.7-2.0
Refractory period, ms	250, (312), 437
Hysteresis, ms	(0), 125, 250, 375
Diameter of connector, mm	3.2
Dimensions, mm	51.5x47x5.8
Weight, g	30

Parameters of standard program installed by the manufacturer are indicated in parentheses.

The EKS-520-children's model, an electrocardiostimulator based on the EKS-501, and the EKS-464, a new improved model developed on a higher technical level, are being prepared for production.

**IZh-76 Gas Pistol**

You can use the gas pistol for self-defense by using 8-mm gas cartridges and also for giving sound and light signals using 8-mm sound signal cartridges.

**Features:**

It has an original external appearance and small dimensions.

The pistol's automatic action operates on the blow-back operated principle.

The automatic cycle includes:

- extraction and ejection of the expended cartridge case;
- arming of the trigger and hammer mechanism;
- chambering of the next round from the magazine.

The pistol is equipped with a safety mechanism to prevent accidental firing.

#### Technical Characteristics

Cartridge used	8-mm gas and sound signal made by Wadie, SAX, SM (FRG)
Effective range of aerosol cloud	up to 3 meters
Minimum permissible distance from pistol to target	1.5 meters
Magazine capacity	5 cartridges
Dimensions, mm (max.)	135x95x25
Weight, kg (max.)	0.5

#### Liquid-Cooled Engine

The engine is used as the power plant on IZh-Yupiter-5 motorcycles with a sidecar and also on snowmobiles, mini-tractors, and other motorized vehicles.

#### Merits of the engine:

- high off-road capabilities;
- low-percentage oil content in fuel (as low as 1:50);
- uses A-76 or AI-93 gasoline;
- cooled with antifreeze or water.

#### Technical Characteristics

Displacement volume, $\text{cm}^3$	347.8
Cylinder diameter, mm	62
Piston stroke, mm	57.6
Compression ratio	9.2:1
Maximum effective power at 5300 $\text{RPM}^{-1}$ , kW	18.4
Maximum torque at 4800 $\text{RPM}^{-1}$ , Nm	35.3
Number of gears	4
Minimum specific fuel consumption, g/kWh, not more than	400
Dimensions, mm	500x490x390
Weight, kg	49

#### Hand-Held Electric Drill

Used to make holes from 6 to 25 mm in diameter in concrete, stone, brick, and other materials, making grooves, breaking up concrete and brickwork, wood-working, and as a screwdriver and drill.

#### Features of the drill:

It is set for a specific mode automatically, simultaneously with installation of the tool for the corresponding purpose.

The tool's attachment fitting makes it possible to attach bits with an "SDS+" shank.

The presence of an air-cooling system ensures an extended operating mode for the mechanisms without overheating.

It possesses a high output and is vibration-safe.

#### Technical Characteristics

Operating mode	percussion-rotary, rotary, screw-driver
Average drilling speed with strength of 10 MPa with bit diameter of 14 mm, mm/min	150
Range of diameters of openings formed in modes, mm	
as drill	1-11
as perforator	6-25
Maximum drilling depth, mm	200
Impact energy, J	1.3-6
Impact frequency, $\text{s}^{-1}$	3700
Rotating speed of tool, RPM	800
Type of electric motor	single-phase commutator
Power, W:	
demand	405
rated	250
Voltage, V	220
Current frequency, Hz	50
Type of current	single-phase, alternating
Dimensions (without side handle and tool), mm	415x185x75
Cord length, mm	3000
Weight (without side handle, tool, and cord), kg	3.1

Our address: 426063, Izhevsk, ul. Promyshlennaya, 8, "Izhevsk Mechanical Plant" State Enterprise

Telephones: (3412) 76-22-65, 75-37-35, 76-29-70. Teletype: 255132 Switchboard. Telefax: (3412) 76-01-74.

The following addresses can also be used for questions of acquiring products of the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant State Enterprise:

252001, Kiev, ul. Zhitomirskaya, 12, "Sapsan" Firm;

640003, Kurgan, ul. Myagotina, 49 "a", "Duplet" Firm;

656010, Barnaul, ul. Alekseyevoy, 17, "ALT-IZh" Subsidiary;

664003, Irkutsk, ul. Dzerzhinskogo, 30, "Vostok-IZh" Firm;

197376, St. Petersburg, ul. Professora Popova, 23, "Bars" Industrial Commerce Firm;

426000, Izhevsk, per. Severnyy, 61, "Izhevskiy ruzhya" Firm.



### **Pentagon Seeks To Buy Aircraft Parts From Urals Factory**

93P50291A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Sep 93  
Night Edition p 1

[Unattributed item under the rubric "This Is the News TRUD Correspondents and Information Agencies Report": "Uralers Working for the Pentagon"]

[Text] The Pentagon has proposed concluding two contracts—for 400 thousand dollars and 1.2 million dollars—to a defense plant in the Kama-Urals region. The U.S. military department intends to receive parts for its own aircraft from the Urals plant. Moreover, if the first deals are successful, the arrangement will be made permanent.

Recently, military output at that Urals plant has been cut back by 82 percent. The URALSKIY RABOCHIY newspaper, reporting on this, considers that the Pentagon can put the plant's affairs in order and, furthermore, make possible a normal course of conversion.

## **RUSSIA: NAVAL FORCES**

### **Pacific Fleet Commander Baltin Profiled**

934F1185B Moscow NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL  
in English No 37, Sep 93 p 28

[Unattributed item under "People" rubric]

[Text] The Pacific Fleet usually welcomed a new commander in all its magnificence. However, Admiral Georgi Gurinov, the newly appointed commander, saw it in an unenviable state. He came hot on the heels of the scandal over Russkiy Island, where the sailors lived in shocking conditions disgracing the honor of the Russian Fleet. It turned out that the situation in other units of the Fleet was no better.

During his career Gurinov did not come across such laxity, and he has a long service record. On graduating from the Caspian Higher Naval School 37 years ago, he served in the strategic missile units and was the Commander of an Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery in different ships and units. At the Black Sea Fleet he served as Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander. Admiral Gurinov was also Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Having arrived in Vladivostok in the capacity of Commander of the Pacific Fleet (it was his 21st change of duty station), Gurinov decided first to put things in order in all units. He is not inclined to effect cosmetic reforms but hopes to implement the ten-year program for the development of the Russian Navy. This program was already approved by the Defense Ministry and submitted for consideration by the government and parliament. After this, it will have to be approved by the president.

"The unstable economic situation in the country is adversely affecting the climate in the navy crews," the commander says. "I see one of my principal tasks in

rallying the personnel and improving the psychological situation. A kind and just attitude towards people, and an understanding of their problems must help work jointly and more effectively and decide the complex issues of ensuring the normal activity of the fleet and raising its combat power."

### **Official Department: Naval Promotions, Instructions on Contracts**

93UM0760B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 6, Jun 93 (signed to press 22 Jun 93) pp 13-15

[Presidential edict and directive of the deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation]

[Text]

### **From the Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On Promotion of Officers, Generals, and Admirals of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"**

To promote the individuals below to the ranks indicated:

#### **VICE ADMIRAL:**

Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Vasilyev

Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Suchkov

#### **LIEUTENANT-GENERAL:**

Valeriy Iosifovich Bumagin

#### **REAR-ADMIRAL:**

Nikolay Ivanovich Bartinov

Mikhail Ivanovich Kaverzov

Aleksandr Ivanovich Neshcheret

Valeriy Nikolayevich Panferov

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Svintsov

#### **MAJOR-GENERAL:**

Vladimir Ilichu Kuropatkin

Aleksandr Stepanovich Pustoutov

[Signed] B. Yeltsin.

President of the Russian Federation

No. 601 of 6 May 1993

Moscow, the Kremlin

### **Directive of the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, "On the Procedure for Concluding Contracts with Citizens of the Russian Federation Joining the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"**

In connection with the entry into force on 1 March 1993 of the Russian Federation Law on Military Service Obligation and Military Service<sup>1</sup> (hereinafter referred to as the Law) and until passage of the Statute on the Procedure for Performance of Military Service, I propose:

1. The Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commanders of districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies, and flotillas, commanders (chiefs) of the combat arms, chiefs of the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, commanders of large units and military units, chiefs of institutions, military educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and military commissars shall organize explanatory and preparatory work for concluding contracts on performance of military service by service members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in order to begin practical work on concluding contracts on performance of military service by service members after the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's approval of the Statute on the Procedure for Performance of Military Service.

In doing so, bear in mind that in accordance with Article 60 of the Law, contracts must be concluded:

a) with service members studying at military schools, military institutes, military academies, postgraduate studies, military doctoral studies, and at military departments of civilian educational institutions of higher professional education—by 31 May 1993, inclusively.

With service members who are 1993 graduates of military educational institutions, the contract must be concluded in accordance with the requirements of the 1993 Directive No. D-30 of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:

b) with service members in the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank) or higher and service members filling positions calling for the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank) or higher—by 31 August 1993, with the exception of service members indicated in subparagraph "a" of this paragraph of the directive:

c) with remaining service members—by 31 December 1994, inclusively.

Work to conclude contracts with service members performing military service under the draft is to be conducted constantly.

2. The conduct of explanatory work aimed at concluding contracts on performance of military service is to be guided by the Methods Instructions for entering military service under contract by various categories of citizens of the Russian Federation (Attachment No. 1 to this directive), with special attention of officials, service members, and citizens entering military service directed to the following:

—a service member concluding a contract specified by paragraphs "b"<sup>2</sup> or "c"<sup>3</sup> of part one of Article 33 of the Law in the future may be deprived of the opportunity to be assigned to military positions filled by colonels (captains 1st rank) or higher officers, and a service

member concluding a contract on performance of military service in the cadres of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (paragraph "a"<sup>4</sup> of part one of Article 33 of the Law) may be assigned to a military position with a transfer to a new duty location without his consent;

—the right to sign a contract on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation according to the sample format (Attachment No. 2 to this directive) is to be granted to commanders (chiefs) who have the right to issue orders;

—after concluding a contract with service members who are on orders and with civilians who are in the reserve, commanders (chiefs) shall issue personnel orders on the start of military service under contract according to the attached samples (Attachment No. 3 to this directive);

—citizens heading to military units to conclude a contract will be provided military travel documents (money) in accordance with articles 15 and 16 of the Manual for Processing Troop Movements in the Ministry of Defense and Payments for Them.<sup>5</sup> A daily allowance of money shall be paid to them for the travel time at the established norms.

3. Conduct of explanatory work with service members of the Western Group of Forces shall be guided by the following:

—conclusion of contracts with service members of the Western Group of Forces is to be completed by 31 August 1993, inclusively;

—with service members of military units to be disbanded, a contract specified under paragraph "a" of part one of Article 33 of the Law shall be concluded.

4. A contract on performance of military service is to be concluded with officers of the scientific and scientific-pedagogical staff having academic degrees or academic titles, also those with a medical specialty, and officers of financial support specialties who have reached or are over (but not more than four years) the age limit for being in military service, but such contracts are not to be concluded with officers in the rank of colonel-general, the equivalent, or higher.

5. Service members who have not concluded contracts within the established time periods shall be discharged from military service in accordance with and on the grounds specified by the Law.

6. The directive shall be sent out to the individual military unit.

[Signed] Colonel-General V. Mironov  
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation  
No. D3-31 of 6 April 1993  
Moscow

## Footnotes

1. Order No. 75 of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation.
2. Contract on performance of military service in the cadres of a specific military unit.
3. Contract on performance of military service in a specific position in a specific military unit.
4. Contract on performance of military service in the cadres of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, bodies of foreign intelligence, or federal bodies of state security.
5. Brought into force by Order No. 200 of the USSR minister of defense of 1984.

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### Col-Gen Potapov on Solving Problems of Naval Aviation

93UM0760C Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 6, Jun 93 (signed to press 22 Jun 93) pp 29-31

[Article by Col-Gen V. Potapov, commander of Naval Aviation: "Naval Aviation: Problems and Solutions"]

[Text] B.N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation and Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Russia, in defining the role and importance of the Russian Army in the new sociopolitical situation in the country, taking into account the changes that have taken place in the alignment of forces in the world, noted that he sees it reformed and "capable of carrying out combat missions in various conditions and ready to come out in defense of the fatherland and effectively safeguard the state's security and protect its national interests."

The command authorities of naval aviation and fleet air forces see their tasks as reforming subordinate structures in these interests. Therefore, even with considerable reduction in budget appropriations, limits of fuels and lubricants, and capabilities for commissioning and overhauling aviation and flight support equipment, the main goal of flight training remains to maintain the level of training of such a number of combat-ready crews at which, if necessary, every aviation unit would be able to carry out its primary combat mission using all available serviceable aircraft and stocks of weapons.

It is known that in the structure of our navy, naval aviation remains the main striking power, being the most mobile and highly effective means of conducting armed warfare at sea, along with submarines and surface ships. Additionally, in peacetime conditions, its role is great in illuminating the surface and underwater situation and timely disclosure of the scale of forces' buildup by foreign states on threatening maritime axes. Therefore, in the immediate future, naval aviation will be required

to have in combat-ready form: anti-submarine, missile-carrying, fighter, and attack aviation forces, including ship-based as well as special aviation subunits.

In our opinion, during the course of developing and improving naval aviation, priority must be given to using ship-based aircraft. For in the navies of developed states today, warships virtually do not go to sea without their aviation. There is also an unquestionable need to develop reconnaissance and amphibious aviation able to operate from a water area, ensure disclosure of the surface and underwater situation, and issue target designation to weapons of naval forces. Their aircraft have a large operating radius, and in addition, the latter can stay afloat at sea for a long time. Ship-based fighters that make spring-board takeoffs and arresting gear landings, which are already entering service, are acquiring a special role in increasing the combat stability of naval forces at sea in today's conditions.

There is no doubt that considerably more attention will be given to equipping naval aviation with new modern aircraft, advanced models of aviation weapons and armament, and systems for servicing them, as the crisis phenomena are overcome in our economy. However, problems have emerged in organizing naval aviation training, and the attention of the naval aviation leadership is concentrated on solving them today. Despite the considerable reduction in the limits of fuel, frequent unforeseen disruptions in its delivery to the fleets, and restrictions on the service life of obsolete aviation equipment, it is very important not to permit long interruptions in flights. This can lead not only to a sharp decrease in the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of units, but also to an increase in the threat to flight safety. Therefore, in the daily activities of aviation commanders, priority is being given to concern about the constant maintenance of professional training level of flight personnel and a search for ways, methods, and means for ensuring continuity and systematic nature of flights.

In the conditions that have been created, we in the staff of the Aviation Directorate of the Navy are also constantly adjusting the use of the service life of aviation equipment and available fuel and lubricants. By maneuvering them within reasonable limits, we strive to maintain the combat effectiveness of units, subunits, and crews for maintaining their readiness for combat operations. This requires daily monitoring of the status of every airfield, the arrival and availability of fuel, and the serviceability of equipment, taking into account the weather forecast and other factors affecting flight safety. On this basis, it is possible to influence the accomplishment of combat training missions and manage them in the interests of efficient use of material resources. In positive resolution of this urgent problem, we rely to a considerable extent on the fleets' command authorities and on the commanders personally. The latter are charged with distribution of financial resources for payment to industry for fuel and lubricants and spare

assemblies for aviation equipment. In our opinion, further improvement in the system of mutual payments will undoubtedly help to reduce interruptions in flight.

Closely connected to this is resolving the problems of restoring the service life of aviation equipment, and narrowing the repair base that made this a problem, which is threatening to ground a considerable portion of the aircraft fleet and aviation systems. Therefore, in the interests of effectively using limited financial resources for the purchase of spare parts and finished products together with the Air Force, Air Defense and Army Aviation, contracts are being concluded for repair of unguaranteed equipment and assembly units, as well as their servicing by representatives of industry. In addition, we are cooperating with design bureaus, the Department of the Aviation Industry, and manufacturing plants to extend the service life of aviation equipment and its individual assemblies. We have managed to satisfy the needs of the Northern Fleet Air Forces for aircraft engines, conduct a major overhaul of part of the ground support equipment, and purchase for naval pilots the number of water-survival suits they were short, without which flights over the sea are categorically prohibited. But this still does not fully guarantee the ability to ensure uninterrupted flight operations. Radical measures are required to increase the combat capabilities of units of ship-based and antisubmarine aviation, since a considerable number of aviation systems are at the limit of their operating life, and some of them are also obsolete.

We intend to continue work to create new aviation antisubmarine systems, in particular, based on using an advanced long-range amphibious aircraft that is in stage of completing testing. It is able, at long distances from shore and for a long time, to conduct a search for submarines, track them and, if necessary, use effective weapons against them. We have the founding and material base for completing this work. The amphibious aircraft, more than once demonstrated at international air shows, has received quite favorable reviews by authoritative experts as an advanced aircraft for carrying out missions in remote areas of the sea. It will also be irreplaceable in rescuing crews of ships and aircraft in distress at sea and may be used as an aircraft platform for reconnaissance and target designation for fleet strike aircraft.

A new generation of ship-based helicopters is being developed, including an upgraded helicopter antisubmarine system with new types of antisubmarine torpedoes, missiles, and guided depth charges. It is planned to install attachments for using air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles on these helicopters, which will expand considerably the range of missions they can accomplish. What is more, use of this ship-based helicopter will make it possible to partially solve the most critical problem for the Navy of providing automatic target designation for missile systems of ships and shore units. This is important, since the aviation target designation systems being

used today in fleet reconnaissance aviation units have practically used up their established service life.

The Su-24mr reconnaissance aircraft can for now, to some extent, conduct systematic aerial reconnaissance of the surface situation in the interests of the fleets. But new, modern systems are needed to provide reconnaissance and target designation in the distant zone. There are collectives developing such systems and a scientific and production base. The interconnections have been provided. The problems are quite solvable provided there is timely financing of work without an artificial delay, leading not only to an increase in cost but also to the systems becoming obsolete.

I will discuss another very important problem that is solely characteristic of naval aviation. It is known that, [unlike] the other branches of Russia's Armed Forces, only the Navy, having aviation in its composition, was deprived of all its aviation centers during the course of sovereignization of the former republics of the USSR. They went under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. For this reason, we cannot accomplish retraining of flight personnel arriving from Air Force higher educational institutions [VUZes] to aircraft and systems in the inventory of fleet air force units and purposefully training pilots of antisubmarine and ship-based aviation.

An extreme need has arisen to take urgent measures for organizing at least one Navy Center on the territory of the Russian Federation. However, our efforts, although supported by the Navy command authorities and leading directorates of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, have been clearly insufficient to resolve this most important problem. No one has any doubts about the need to create naval aviation centers in the shortest possible time to replace those that went over to the jurisdiction of Ukraine. But this truth has to be proved at all echelons. A comprehensive study of this issue shows that the most favorable conditions for its qualitative functioning exist only on the Black Sea coastline. With minimal expenditures of material resources and minimal time, a center can be organized on the base of the Yeysk School for Pilots, which is liable to be disbanded. Having been part of the Navy, [this school] had trained personnel for naval aviation. In 1991, during the course of discussing this issue, the commander-in-chief of the Air Force also agreed with our arguments. A Ministry of Defense order was even issued on returning the Yeysk School to the Navy. But with the change in leadership of the Ministry of Defense, this order was suspended. Thus, the solution to this problem was again "suspended" for an indefinite period...

Today, we are even more concerned by the fact that school graduates are arriving and will be arriving unprepared for flight operation of naval weapon systems, for flights from the decks of ships, and air navigation over the sea. Based on the above, we continue to insist on our request, making no claims to all the assets of the Yeysk School. We require only part of the training facilities for



organizing theoretical instruction and consent for joint basing with the Air Force at its airfield at least one subunit of ship-based aircraft. Training of pilots is inconceivable without flights in these aircraft at sea.

We have proved that with a favorable resolution of the issue, in the interests of the cause and to mutual benefit, a significant number of the instructors and employees released upon disbanding of the school can be used right at the new school. This would make it possible not only to accelerate the beginning of the training process but also facilitate resolution of the housing problem to a considerable extent. It would seem that all the arguments are substantiated—any other variant of housing the center will require huge capital investments and delay resolution of the problem for many years. But, unfortunately, there is no final decision so far...

Meanwhile, the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" is already part of the Northern Fleet and will soon receive a subunit of ship-based aircraft that have already been accepted from industry. Therefore, practical training of pilots for flights from the decks of the aircraft-carrying cruiser is becoming the most urgent task. According to foreign experience, carrier-based aviation training in the first phase is conducted only through instruction at a ground complex. Apparently we cannot avoid this either. The technique of taking off from a spring board and making arresting gear landings is extremely complex. It is impermissible to risk pilots, aircraft and a quite expensive ship by conducting instruction directly on the ship! Therefore, until construction of at least a simplified version of a ground training complex at one of the Naval Aviation airfields is completed, making it possible to practice elements of taking off from a spring board and final approach for a landing based on the ship type with simulation of arresting gear hook engagement, it will be necessary to look into the possibility of leasing the NITKA [expansion not given] complex in the Crimea. Training of the first group of pilots of ship-based fighters is already being conducted. We are making the maximum use of the experience and assistance of test pilots. However, we are continuing to build up efforts in this direction, for the acuteness of the problem is not decreasing and requires attention at all levels of leadership of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In addition to the problems cited above, in naval aviation, as in other formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, there are many problems associated with the withdrawal of units from the territory of nearby foreign countries and getting them settled at a new place. This, naturally, affects the moral and psychological state of personnel. Therefore, in the work with officers and warrant officers comprising the basis of aviation units, it is important to be able to find a balance of official and personal interests so as to ensure a level of official activities that would, (even in the new and far from ordinary conditions), guarantee maintaining the proper combat readiness without detriment to their social protection.

Special nontraditional forms and methods of educational work are required that would enable a commander to achieve the main objective by force of conviction: To foster a high degree of responsibility from every serviceman for performance of official and military duty. Aviation commanders at all levels are obligated to conduct combat training at a high level in order to ensure the readiness of personnel to carry out missions in any situation.

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### Possible Commercial Uses for Idle Oceanographic Ships

93UM0760D Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 6, Jun 93 (signed to press 22 Jun 93) pp 33-34

[Article by Capt 2d Rank P. Vetlitskiy: "Two Years at the Dock. How Many More?"]

[Text] When in July 1991, after a long cruise as part of a hydrographic expedition of the Baltic Fleet, the oceanographic research ship *Moldaviya* returned to her home dock of Baltiysk; a period of new trials had come in the fate of her crew. However, now the trials were not oceanic, but "land."

For two years now the *Moldaviya* has not left dockside, and the customary rhythm of life at sea in past years has been replaced by the distressing anticipation of further orders on use of the ship. But neither in 1992 nor in 1993 has the ship been given missions characteristic for a ship of this class. There are objective reasons for this: The lack of currency not only for conducting oceanographic research, but even for restoring the vessel's technical readiness. You see, it was built abroad.

"This is a problem not only for the *Moldaviya*," a correspondent was told in April of last year by Captain 1st Rank Yu.V. Sidorov, chief of the Hydrographic Service of the Baltic Fleet. "Out of 19 ships, 11 are overdue for overhauls. If we do not earn the currency to repair them, in time they will simply sink at the dock..."

True, according to Captain 1st Rank B.V. Yukhin, deputy chief of the Hydrographic Service of the Baltic Fleet, the situation as a whole has changed somewhat, and for the better. But the acuteness of the problem, unfortunately, has not decreased. What awaits the oceanographic research ship [OIS] *Moldaviya*, and what kind of an immediate future does it and similar ships have? I was unable to get a specific answer to this question either at the Hydrographic Service of the Baltic Fleet or at the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanography of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

"There is a way out of this—leasing," believe the Baltic Fleet seamen. A visitor to the editorial office and commander of the OIS *Moldaviya*, Captain 1st Rank S.V. Davydov, shares this position.

"And such proposals have been made," says Sergey Vladimirovich [Davydov]. "Thus, in September 1991, the council of the 'Kaliningradrybprom' [Kaliningrad Fishing Industry] made a proposal to the leadership of the Hydrographic Service of the Baltic Fleet to use our vessel for delivering fishing crews to fishing areas. The fishermen assumed all expenses for paying a crew, for supplying fuel and lubricants, and even for restoring service life."

However, since this is something new for the fleet, they decided to make two trial trips in order to make a real assessment of the capabilities of the sides and the economic benefit for the fleet, and then conclude a long-term contract. The approximate time periods for making the trips were agreed upon, and the fleet headquarters verified the vessel's readiness for putting to sea. But several days before the voyage, the Main Staff of the Navy instructed the Baltic Fleet Hydrographic Service to coordinate all aspects of the departure with the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanography. The leadership of that directorate, not objecting to it in principle, unexpectedly put forth a new condition—payment in currency for the two trips. The fishermen did not have the required \$45,000. That is when the correspondence that is customary in such cases began, due to which the departure of the ship was postponed. At that time, no one on the crew could believe that a cruise economically profitable for the Navy would not take place. The terms of payment of the freight charge earned jointly with the fishermen would have made it possible to ensure 100 percent profitability of use of the vessel. But the deal came to a standstill, and then in April 1992, in coordination with the trade union committee of the vessel, we sent a telegram to the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation requesting urgent assistance in resolving this matter.

An answer came in June, signed by then-chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, whom the Secretariat of the Sixth Congress tasked to consider our telegram.

In this response, it emphasized the understanding of the importance of the national economic tasks being carried out by the trawler fleet and stated that the Navy is ready to help it in replacing crews of fishing vessels and in delivering fuel and food to the fishing areas, but only on a mutually advantageous contract basis. It again emphasized that the trawler fleet must consult the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography to coordinate the terms of the lease, and an essential term of the contract must be the trawler fleet's commitment to perform routine repairs on the vessel in 1993 to restore the service life of the main and auxiliary mechanisms. We were also informed that the chief of the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography had already given the appropriate instructions on concluding a lease contract.

"But since the position of the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography has not changed," Sergey Vladimirovich stated more precisely, "the question of leasing a vessel was not favorably resolved. And we

consulted everyone. We even wrote to the president of Russia, but everything remains as before. Time has passed, and the time between overhaul has already expired for the Moldaviya. Funds for conducting the dock work and repairs have not been received.

"At one time we calculated: Losses from inactivity of our vessel amount to approximately 54,000 rubles per day (in 1991 prices), and if we work for fishermen, the net profit for those same days would have been 85,000 rubles. What is this, if not lost profit?"

What about the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography?

"Is it worth grasping at straws?" they ask.

"From the human standpoint, one can understand the position of both the commander of the OIS Moldaviya and the crew," they commented to me at the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography on the situation. "In today's conditions, the forced docking of the Moldaviya hits, first of all, the civilian portion of the crew, who are the most unprotected in material terms. The wages on vessels are extremely low, and it is very difficult for them to live without bonuses for sailing. Therefore, the crew is also losing the best trained specialists; and the quality of maintenance on the vessel is declining, as is even the discipline. Without question, the command authorities are striving to save the collective that was created over years and to preserve the organization of service. Hence, any proposals associated with extended sorties at sea seem to be a panacea from these troubles. Of course, one can present the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography as a conservative interfering with the resolution of this problem, but let us look into it..."

In the numerous responses of the commander-in-chief and the chief of the Main Staff of the Navy to appeals of both the leadership of the "Kaliningradrybprom" and the crew of the Moldaviya to the highest echelons, our clear and unified position is set forth: We have agreed to cooperate, but only on a mutually advantageous contract basis. In making parallel and deeper calculations with which the command authorities of the OIS agree, we ascertained that daily deductions for repair of the vessel are necessary and amount to \$1300. At the first meeting with representatives of the "Kaliningradrybprom," the leadership of the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography proposed taking into account this amount in the contract, but they considered it unacceptable and did not hold any more talks with our administration. In place of this, they chose the path of attempting to use emotional letters and telegrams to influence the course of events, using external levers, up to and including appealing to the country's top leadership.

But you see, one must understand that a Classification I ship is not a disposable syringe, to be used and thrown away. The cost of restoring the vessel's technical readiness after such cruises is not at all comparable to the seemingly

momentary profit from them. Today, the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography has a large number of proposals from state and commercial structures for use of our vessels that are temporarily without work. But only one of the proposals—lease of the hydrographic ship *Astronom* of the Pacific Ocean Fleet—was considered acceptable and actually economically advantageous for the fleet, since the contract took into account all questions, including ship repair. But due to a lack of understanding of this problem, the *Moldaviya* still stands at the dock, not departing for “unprofitable” assistance to the fishermen.

“Which of them is more correct?” I wonder. It is obvious that in the matter of solving the problems of the “white steamships,” as the hydrographic vessels are called in the fleet, no one is indifferent either in the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography or in the hydrographic services of the fleets. As I was told, the Main Administration of Navigation and Oceanography is summarizing the proposals submitted from the localities for future use of this class of vessels and looking for clients for conducting both hydrographic research, the results of which the Navy also needs, and accompanying work. At the same time, the fleets note that in today’s severe shortage conditions, questions of supporting hydrographic ships are still being resolved on a residual principle—after supporting combat ships, for which maintenance funds are also extremely limited. This exacerbates their already difficult situation even further and gives rise to the desire to look independently for at least some kind of use for them. Perhaps the proposal of the “Kaliningradrybprom” in the case of the *Moldaviya* OIS is not altogether advantageous, but one question arises: Why then is the Academy of Sciences, with its own vessels, agreeing to similar terms to fulfill the order of the fishermen? The question remains...

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#### Rear Services Chief on Ship Readiness

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[Interview with Rear Adm Vladimir Ivanovich Uryvskiy, chief of the Technical Directorate of the Navy, by Capt 1st B. Tyurin, MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent: “Problems of Ensuring Technical Readiness”]

[Text] *At the request of MORSKOY SBORNIK, Rear Admiral V.I. Uryvskiy, chief of the Technical Directorate of the Navy, tells about the state of affairs with ensuring the required level of technical readiness of the seagoing forces of Russia's Navy.*

[Tyurin] Vladimir Ivanovich, how is the technical combat readiness of Navy ships ensured during our difficult times? What problems arise here and how are they resolved?

[Uryvskiy] I am not revealing a secret that the basis of ensuring the technical readiness of ships, both before and now, remains the correct operation and maintenance of

equipment in accordance with maintenance and guiding fleet documents. This has been tested and confirmed in practice over many years.

Of all of postwar years, the last three years have proven to be the most difficult for our Navy. These difficulties were also reflected directly on the electromechanical services [EMS] of the fleets, particularly of the Black Sea Fleet, Baltic Fleet, and also the Caspian Sea Flotilla, which are directly responsible for the quality of maintenance of ships, their electromechanical equipment, and for accident prevention. Recently, their work has been complicated by the low manning level of ships, the decline in the level of professional training of specialists, a sharp decrease in appropriations for ship repair and technical maintenance, and shortfalls in the delivery of spare parts, accessory kits and expendable materials. Added to the material and financial reasons were those social in nature: Discharge into the reserve of a considerable number of engineering officers and also the ever-increasing, especially in recent times, lack of desire to serve among many, primarily young officers of the “group commander-battalion commander” level. These reasons are objective in nature, so to speak. But in addition to them, there is also an irresponsible attitude of a number of EMS officials toward their duties, a decrease in professionalism, and formalism and lack of specificity in work. All this led to the fact that today, unfortunately, the work to maintain the technical readiness of ships at the required level and to ensure their accident-free operation cannot be assessed favorably. Above all, this applies to the prevention of fires and the accident rate of equipment, which often occur at the fault of EMS officials and ship personnel. Thus, since November 1990, the accident rate of ships where personnel were directly or indirectly at fault increased. An order of the Ministry of Defense and several orders of the commander in chief of the Navy were issued only for cases of fires during this period. This, in turn, indicates that the analysis of such accidents was conducted in a simplified manner at large units and on ships, and the findings from them were made superficially.

[Tyurin] Could you cite some examples of this?

[Uryvskiy] With reference to surface ships, an unsatisfactory situation is taking shape in a number of large units of the Northern Fleet (several fires on the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser “Admiral Gorshkov” and the large ASW ship “Admiral Kharlamov”) and the Pacific Fleet, where extensive, intense, and prolonged fires, with serious consequences, took place on the large ASW ship “Admiral Zakharov” and the destroyer “Bespokoyunny.” They put ships out of service for a prolonged period of time and resulted in a failure to carry out assigned tasks, and considerable funds are required to repair the ships.

We are increasingly concerned about the slow implementation on ships of recommendations developed by the Technical Directorate of the Navy and by the technical directorates of the fleets.



It is known that an accident-free, competent operation of shipborne equipment can be achieved only by accomplishing a comprehensive task of improving the conditions of basing ships, their logistic support, and increasing their manning level and quality of personnel training. Unfortunately, the present system of basing fleet forces cannot satisfy us. This primarily pertains to the conditions of basing large surface ships, on which the most serious situation has taken shape with operation of equipment, its maintenance, and timely technical servicing. We realize that we should not expect a major improvement in these issues in the next few years due to the shortage of funds, but individual ones associated with improving existing basing conditions not requiring large material outlays should be resolved. For example, such facilities may be plants for preparing purified water and filling for ion-exchange filters, BRTS [expansion not given] and boiler houses for providing ships with steam and fresh water. However, both the water-purification plants and the work to modernize existing mooring places, and a number of other facilities have not ended up in the capital construction plans of the Northern and Pacific fleets in the last 10 years. Even work for which there are decisions by the commander in chief of the Navy has remained undone for many long years. Therefore, it is necessary to look for possible ways of improving the conditions for basing ships through our own efforts. This is especially timely now. For example, in the Northern Fleet, through the efforts of the EMS of one of the large units of surface ships a steam line has been installed from the city boiler house to two mooring places, which has made it possible to solve the problem of supplying ships with steam during the period of conducting scheduled preventive maintenance inspections [PPO] and scheduled preventive maintenance [PPR] of ship boilers, if only partially.

The main problem in accomplishing the task of maintaining technical readiness is what in previous years we named the "human factor," although proper steps were not always taken to create the appropriate duty conditions for ship personnel. Now this problem has intensified even more on our nuclear-powered cruisers. Only a few people are permitted to perform independently the duties of main propulsion plant operator. There is also a great shortage of engineering officers on other large surface ships, as a result of which the proper volume and quality of equipment maintenance are not ensured, and this does nothing more than create the prerequisites for equipment malfunctions. What is more, even a serviceable ship in such conditions cannot put out to sea to carry out missions.

Without solving the problem of manning ships and training personnel, we also will not be able to ensure maintaining ships in service. Those limited funds which are allocated for maintenance and repair of ships will be expended in an ever-increasing amount for unscheduled work to put into service equipment that is inoperative through the fault of personnel. We have such examples (the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral Gorshkov" and the BRZK [expansion not given] "Ural").

As far as logistic support is concerned, in my view, you will not find a person in the Navy today who would not understand that the seagoing forces must be provided fully with both material and financial resources. Already today the decision must be made either to support the fleet which we now have according to full norms, or reduce it, based on the ability to allocate financial resources for the Navy. We cannot postpone making this decision any longer.

[Tyurin] It is alarming that in a number of surface forces of all fleets, their technical readiness during the year did not make it possible to maintain the established norms of maintaining ships in commission.

[Uryvskiy] Here one could cite a fairly large list of such forces and names of officers heading EMS's in the forces. I am deeply convinced that the existing situation is the result of the insufficient influence of the EMS's of forces and the technical directorates of fleets on the process of using ships, as well as the incomplete work in ensuring the technical readiness of these surface ships. It has been noted also that in the Pacific Fleet, Northern Fleet, and Baltic Fleet proper attention is being given to saving the service life of ships, although it is well known to everyone, and this has been emphasized repeatedly, that in conditions of the reduction in appropriations for maintenance and repair, failure to fulfill the established maintenance norms leads to premature aging and decommissioning of ships from the Navy. And we already have graphic examples of that: The majority of Project 1134-A large ASW [antisubmarine warfare] ships ("Kronshtadt" class) have been decommissioned for the reasons cited above before expiration of their service life. Similar examples of decommissioning are the Project 1134 guided-missile cruisers ("Vice Admiral Drozd" class) in the Pacific Fleet, Project 1135 escort ships ("Bditelnyy" class) in the Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, and Northern Fleet...

[Tyurin] We touched upon questions of maintenance, basing, and the accident rate of surface ships. How do these matters stand with submarines?

[Uryvskiy] Today, all submarine forces are ensuring observance of the established norms for maintaining ships in commission. It must be recognized that this is achieved basically through more qualitative use of funds allocated to the fleets for ensuring maintenance, decommissioning a considerable number of submarines that have gone past the established service life, and also those that have not gone past these time periods but whose repair presently is not economically feasible. However, ensuring the established norms of maintaining nuclear-powered submarines in service today requires an increasingly deeper analysis of their condition, thorough planning of use, and daily work to prevent accidents and ensure safety of operation of equipment. Unfortunately, the quality of this work in a number of submarine forces does not always correspond to the imposed requirements, which is evidenced by the disruptions in the combat training plans. Another aspect should be noted

here, which illustrates such a state on a nuclear-powered submarine of the Northern Fleet. A bearing on reversible transducer went out, and the personnel cannot perform the operation to replace it. The repairmen from one of the Navy ship repair facilities replace the bearing and at the same time performed a number of other repairs on other mechanisms. But it turned out that the personnel of Department 4 of this nuclear-powered submarine did not monitor their activities. During the course of performing this work, a number of other pieces of equipment on the boat were disabled as a result of low qualifications, thus giving rise to a whole "chain" of malfunctions. As a result, the boat was unable to put to sea on schedule. The reason for this was the failure of officials to carry out their duties and the poor training of both the repairmen and the personnel of the submarine.

The incessant cases of equipment being disabled due to incompetent actions of personnel and flagrant violations of instructions for operating systems and mechanisms are causing significant harm to the state of combat readiness and also considerable material damage. The impression is being created that the work that was begun in the fleets after the loss of the "Komsomolets" nuclear-powered submarine has fallen off. In task force EMS's and fleet technical departments, exactingness on subordinates has decreased and there is no monitoring of execution of even their own instructions. Maintenance of ships has deteriorated.

[Tyurin] Vladimir Ivanovich, it is believed that your submarine fleet is provided ship repair better than the surface fleet. In addition to fleet ship repair facilities, nuclear-powered submarine forces also have their own floating repair facilities, as well as SPTB's and SRM's.

[Uryvskiy] As far as use of the ship repair facilities is concerned, here it is primarily the shortage of funds being allocated to the fleet for repair that is having an effect, due to which the task of ensuring their most efficient use arises. The floating repair facilities are designed to perform inter-cruise (navigation) repairs and eliminate malfunctions. Lately they have been experiencing the same difficulties as the entire fleet, work time losses on operations not associated with repair have increased, the shortage of production workers has increased, and their professional training has dropped. The training of personnel at Navy facilities is not properly organized, although talk about the need for such training has been going on for years. In addition, modernization of the technical base and repair of the floating repair facilities has been virtually stopped. On the whole, they are still handling the tasks entrusted to them.

As you can see, the situation is imposing a special responsibility on engineer-mechanics for training personnel of nuclear-powered submarines; on the other hand, it is making it necessary to develop and improve floating repair facilities. Both tasks must be accomplished without delay and with the appropriate quality.

Now about specialized production and technical bases (SPTB's). Their original tasks involved doing maintenance on nuclear-powered submarines and timely elimination of malfunctions and failures during the guaranteed period and, in addition, assisting personnel in servicing nuclear-powered submarines during the unguaranteed period. It must be noted that lately, in conditions of the significant reduction in appropriations and the sharp increase in the cost of the per diem costs of each SPTB specialist, we have been forced to reorganize this structure, reducing both the amount and numerical strength. At the same time, we have also had to reduce the volume of work performed by the SPTB, leaving primarily: Timely elimination of malfunctions, participation in periodic technical servicings and inspections of armament and equipment, providing for joint work of personnel with representatives of industry, and also conducting work to extend the service life of certain models of armament, for which the need to involve specialists of industry is stipulated in the maintenance documentation. For the time being, we are not imposing other work on the SPTB's.

Finally, a few words about "small ship-repair (repair) enterprises" created at the corresponding plants and performing work for servicing part of the equipment. As an analysis of accumulated experience has shown, such enterprises perform work at a greater efficiency with fewer expenditures than ship repair facilities and SPTB's and with a sufficiently high quality. Therefore, we plan to expand cooperation with them.

[Tyurin] What other problems do you see on the path to achieving high technical readiness of nuclear-powered submarines?

[Uryvskiy] Today, scientific support of nuclear-powered submarine maintenance is very critical. The problem is that up to now it has not been properly reflected in the structure of Navy scientific research institutes. Several years ago, the maintenance directorate was disbanded at the Navy's Central Scientific Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding, and small laboratories without much scientific potential were created on its base which, unfortunately, are unable to fully resolve all issues facing maintenance organizations of the Navy.

[Tyurin] Vladimir Ivanovich, I would like to hear from you how things stand today with ensuring the security of nuclear-powered submarines withdrawn from the Navy and those presently located in task forces?

[Uryvskiy] I cannot add anything new to what has been said earlier. I can only confirm that the condition of such ships is technically unsatisfactory. It is necessary to maintain them afloat and carry out measures to prevent pollution of the environment and preclude the possibility of a malfunction of nuclear reactors, and this is diverting forces and assets intended for ships being operated. The Navy's Main Directorate of Maintenance and Repair is taking steps to develop special filler-materials to ensure maintaining the nuclear-powered

submarines afloat, but due to the restriction in financing, this work is moving ahead slowly today.

I want to touch upon another aspect of the question regarding maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines. This is the recharging of their reactors, the effectiveness of using the floating technical bases and other special equipment, and also the question of handling radioactive waste. Experience shows that today work to replace reactor cores and unload them from decommissioned ships is acquiring paramount importance, for it determines, moreover, the social and psychological situation in individual regions of the country. Although the status of forces and assets for recharging reactors in the fleets makes it possible to accomplish the tasks facing them, in this are many unfinished tasks have accumulated, adversely affecting the quality and safety of work.

We are concerned about the insufficient degree of equipment of the fleets with reloading equipment, caused by the fact that the manufacturer, even despite government decisions, is accomplishing his deliveries at an extremely low rate. The fleets are also experiencing difficulties with the receipt of new tenders. Such vessels of the old project have already practically completed "their service to the fleet," and the builder of them has ended up in a so-called nearby foreign country. The Russian government adopted a decision on building and purchasing ships of this plan in Ukraine, but there is still no decision at the inter-governmental level on practical organization of work, although this question has been included on the agenda of negotiations of delegations from Russia and Ukraine. True, the possibility of building these vessels that are very much needed by the Navy at one of the shipbuilding enterprises of Russia is already being examined. For the time being, spare parts and accessories repair kits have been sent to maintain the fleet reloading equipment in working condition in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Ocean Fleet, and specifications have been drawn up for repair of reloading equipment. Up to now, however, repair of this equipment has not been organized at ship repair facilities, and the spare parts kits are sitting in warehouses. The technical condition of the equipment continues to deteriorate, which has been recorded already in fleet nuclear safety inspection reports.

One must add to this that the rhythm of production of rechargers is decreasing due to flaws in planning and quality of preparing such work. Suffice it to say that in 1991 in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Ocean Fleet, only 50 percent of the work approved by the fleet commanders in recharger plans was performed. To correct the state of affairs in this area, ship repair facilities for rechargers were formed in 1992; however, the output from them is still insufficient. The problems are with maintaining tenders in operating condition, caused by disruptions in the deadlines of their scheduled docking repairs, extending the service life of equipment, and so forth. Thus, objective reasons cause problems that are subsequently difficult to overcome.

Problems of handling radioactive waste continue to remain unresolved. The earlier-used method of burying them is now prohibited by the Russian Federation Law on Protection of the Environment. But the Russian Federation Law on State Technical Policy in the Area of Handling Radioactive Waste has not yet been passed. The time periods for creating a state system in the country, as called for by draft laws in this area, are also being indefinitely delayed as their consideration by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is postponed.

[Tyurin] Vladimir Ivanovich, what have the command authorities of Navy undertaken to overcome the above difficulties and how has the country's leadership helped them?

[Uryvskiy] Through efforts of the command authorities, by 1989 we managed to raise the level of ship repair to the maximum in the entire history of the Soviet Navy—to 83 percent of requirements. To a considerable degree this was also helped by fulfillment of a number of decrees of the USSR Government on developing our ship repair facilities between 1960 and 1980, and also conducting organizational and technical measures in the Navy for decommissioning obsolete ships and reducing programs for re-equipping. But subsequently, the increasing crisis phenomena in the country's economy and the failure to always make sound decisions on conversion of defense enterprises already in 1990 resulted in a reduction in the volumes of ship repair and a decrease in providing repairs to the Navy as a whole to 70 percent. Appeals and reports during 1990-1991 to higher echelons, including to the government, made it possible to keep it at the 1990 level in 1991 and to plan a similar volume for 1992. However, by the end of 1992, together with the collapse of the Soviet system of command and control of the defense complex, the situation had deteriorated sharply. Despite the reports of the commander in chief of the Navy to the minister of defense, the government, and the president of the Russian Federation on the catastrophic consequences for the Navy's combat readiness from the planned decrease in appropriations for repair and maintenance of ships and vessels, funds amounting to approximately one-sixth of the minimum required amount were allocated to the Navy's Main Directorate of Maintenance and Repair for 1992! Compared to 1991, the amount of ship repair at Navy shipyards decreased 11 percent and, paradoxically, the government did not allocate funds for repair of ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Sea Flotilla and, in addition, for repair of ships abroad, although it continued at 17 shipyards in 10 countries... As a result, about 520 ships and vessels were left not being put in for repairs! And of those that were, about half are being repaired by ship repair shops and mobile repair facilities of task forces.

In these conditions, due to the indebtedness for payment of repairs and financing delays, repair work has been curtailed at a number of industrial enterprises, due to which their docks have been turned into places for ships to stand idle. Therefore, whereas 250 ships and vessels were repaired in 1991, in 1992 they were not scheduled



to be turned over at all at enterprises of industry, and only Navy facilities were to repair about 30 units. As a result, enterprises of industry began intensive reorientation on repairing vessels of other departments, and it will take a long time and considerable funds for them to restore the military ship repair base.

An especially critical situation has taken shape with the repair of surface combatants—"Kiev" class aircraft-carrying cruisers, "Admiral Nakhimov" (formerly "Kirov") class nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers, "Slava" class guided-missile cruisers, "Udaloy" class large ASW ships, "Sovremenny" class destroyers, "Bditelny" class escort ships, and a number of others. The problem is that the period between repairs for 45-65 percent of the ships of these classes has either expired or will expire in the next few years.

Repair of our foreign-made ships and certain domestic-made ships and vessels at overseas shipyards has virtually stopped. Due to the lack of currency, about \$40 million in bills to foreign companies has not yet been paid for repairs done on ships and vessels in 1990-1991, resulting in repair work being stopped.

Unfortunately, in 1993 the situation has deteriorated even more. Half of the year has already passed, but we still do not have a budget, and the Navy's debts to naval repair facilities and industry for repair work being performed are growing catastrophically. Many facilities are already on the verge of stopping work, and the fleet's system of technical support is on the verge of total collapse. It is under such conditions that we are trying to accomplish the tasks facing us to preserve the combat potential of our Navy.

[Tyurin] Vladimir Ivanovich, thank you for such a frank and detailed account of the problems of maintaining the technical combat readiness of the Navy's ships today.

We wish you success in your very essential job.

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### Post-War Torpedo Boat Designs

93UM0760F Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 6, Jun 93 (signed to press 22 Jun 93) pp 66-71

[Article by Ye. Yukhnin, former chief designer and chief of the Almaz TsMKB, Hero of Socialist Labor, and winner of the Lenin Prize; A. Vasilyev, candidate of technical sciences; and V. Marinin: "Torpedo Boats"]


[Text] One of the subclasses of combatant craft that received considerable development after World War II in most navies of the world, including the Soviet Navy, was torpedo boats. In the USSR, their construction was already called for in the first military shipbuilding program for 1946-1955. Torpedo boats also developed in the future, despite the appearance in our Navy of such advanced combatant craft as guided-missile boats. Then,

in the mid and late 1940's, in the process of comprehending the experience of the Great Patriotic War, including the experience of combat employment of torpedo boats both in our Navy and in foreign navies, work unfolded in our country to select their optimum specifications. This, in experts' opinions, would ensure the most effective use of such weapons in naval action now already in new conditions. Navy specialists in the field of shipbuilding, armament, and equipment, as well as those shipbuilding enterprises and planning and design organizations that already had sufficient experience in creating various combatant craft, were enlisted in this work.

It must be noted that the work to create new types of torpedo boats was conducted then along two basic directions. The first called for designing and building so-called "large" torpedo boats [BTKA], which due to their weight and size characteristics (basically the width), could not be transported by rail. The second, which "blended in" with the dimensions of the flat car, were called "small" torpedo boats [MTKA]. In addition, the BTKA's were to accomplish their missions at considerable distances from their basing points, which required them to have enhanced seagoing qualities, a sufficient range (up to 1000 miles), and endurance (on the order of 5-6 days). The MTKA's were planned for operations in the areas of their bases and lines of communication. Their cruising range was limited to 500 miles and their endurance to 1-1.5 days. From the thought of sufficient seagoing ability (up to 5 points) and maximum hull payload volume, the BTKA's were "seen" without planing steps on the underwater portion, and the MTKA's retained the planing step in order to achieve higher speeds when engaging.

In that period of time, the armament of those and other torpedo boats was identical in their nomenclature: Two non-trainable deck torpedo tubes, and two or three either 12.7-mm or 14.5-mm twin anti-aircraft machinegun, (basically turret), mounts. They later shifted this to "increased" calibers—first to 25-mm and then 30-mm, 57-mm, and even 76.2-mm automatic artillery mounts. In order to achieve the optimum weight of armament, the 533-mm torpedoes were chosen for the large torpedo boats, and the 450-mm torpedoes for the small torpedo boats. Individual torpedo boat projects called for up to two depth charge dispensers so the boats could carry out certain antisubmarine defense tasks. In addition, certain BTKA's could take an "overload" of several sea mines. On the whole, in accordance with the then-existing views of operational-tactical employment of torpedo boats [TKA], the latter were to make torpedo strikes against enemy surface ships and transports as part of a fleet's various forces organizations; that is, together with aviation, destroyers, and light cruisers.

In addition to the start of design developments for torpedo boats, the decision was made to complete construction of the series of torpedo boats already under construction. They included the Project TM-200 and 123-bis TKA's. In addition, after making adjustment to these programs, production began of a TKA under



Project TD-200-bis torpedo boat

Project TD-200, TD-200-bis, M-123-bis, and 123-K. They all were classified as small torpedo cruisers.

The first of these torpedo boats to enter the postwar Soviet Navy were 19 Project TM-200 boats. They were laid back in 1943 at the shipyards in Rybinsk. The chief designer of these torpedo boats was L.L. Yermash. The boats had a displacement of 47 tonnes and a speed of 38 knots. In 1946, simultaneous with their commissioning, the Project TD-200 torpedo boat, similar in specifications, was built at one of the Leningrad shipyards. This project was developed at a branch of TsKB-32 [Central Design Bureau] by a group of specialists also headed by L.L. Yermash. According to the detail design, the TD-200-bis boats were equipped with a three-shaft diesel power plant (each diesel with 1000 hp), providing a top speed of about 40 knots. Between 1947 and 1952, the Navy received 169 of these boats from industry; beginning in 1950, 46 of these boats were equipped with radar.

Small torpedo boats of other projects were built in three subsequent series during the first war decade. Our Navy received 88 Project 123-bis boats from the Tyumen shipbuilders between 1946 and 1948. This project was created at this shipyard's design bureau by designers headed by F.L. Liventsev. Boats of another modification—Project M-123-bis—were designed at TsKB-19. The chief designer of this project was V.M. Burlakov. Fifty of these boats were built between 1949 and 1951 at Feodosiya. Somewhat later, the Feodosiya shipbuilders transferred to the Soviet Navy 205 Project 123-K torpedo boats equipped with radar. Eight boats of this modification were equipped experimentally with shallowly submerged hydrofoils. The chief designer of these boats was the well-known Soviet engineer R.Ye. Alekseyev, who was working at that time at the design bureau of the Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard. Such an innovation


made it possible to increase the seaworthiness of the boats at moderate wave action and to increase the top speed by 5-6 knots. Series construction of small torpedo boats in the USSR ended with this.

For many years, the Project 183 large torpedo boat became the main type of Soviet torpedo boat created in the late 1940's. Its appearance resulted from the need to have a torpedo boat that differed from its "counterparts" by a higher seaworthiness, range, endurance, speed, and, in addition, more effective armament, including self-defense weapons. In the opinion of designer specialists, this could be achieved only by rejecting the requirements to observe "size restrictions."

Development of the new torpedo boat (code number 183) was assigned to the collective of NKVD Special Design Bureau No. 5 (OKB-5), which during the initial postwar years was located on the territory of Shipyard No. 5, and also to specialists of this enterprise's design bureau. P.G. Goynkis was appointed chief designer of the project. He had much experience in creating torpedo boats and particularly the special long-range torpedo boat [STKDD], which entered our Navy during the war and was closest in "concept" to the large torpedo boat.

The new boat project also drew in the experience of creation and combat use of American Wosper, Elko, and Higgins class torpedo boats during the Great Patriotic War, which were delivered to us under the lend-lease program. These boats made a good showing of themselves in combat conditions. In addition, they embodied quite a few successful design solutions.

P.G. Goynkis and Ye.A. Popov, chief of the hull department, were awarded the State Prize for creating the Project 183 boat. The lead boat was built and turned



Project 183 large torpedo boat

over to the Navy in 1949. Despite a number of observations made during the course of state testing, this torpedo boat was recommended for regular production with a few refinements. Construction of these boats began in 1952 and continued until 1960. A total of 674 of these boats under Project 183 and its modifications were built (projects 199, 183-TK, 183-T, 183-E, 183-Ts, 183-A, and 183-U).

In accordance with the detail design, these boats were "large, stepless, semi-gliding, with hard-chine hull lines." The hull material was wood. The basic specifications and performance characteristics of the boats were: Normal displacement—61.5 tonnes; loaded displacement—66.5 tonnes; hull length—25.4 meters; beam—6.24 meters; draft—1.24 meters. It has a four-shaft, diesel power plant (various modifications of the M-50F engine, in particular, the M-50F-1 and M-50FTK) with a total power of 4800 hp. These engines were made by Plant No. 800 and were four-cycle, V-12 diesels. The screws, made according to drawings from the Institute No. 1 of Central Scientific Research Institute [TsNII] 45, were three-bladed, 0.675 meters in diameter, with pitch of 0.925 meters. In the process of operating the first Project 183

boats, personnel encountered an unpleasant peculiarity of the diesels; they stopped during reversing. To study this phenomenon, identify the causes for the failure in engine operation, and develop the necessary recommendations, specialists of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding in the Baltic Sea conducted full-scale tests of M-50F-1 diesels (1954 production year) of one of the torpedo boats (hull number 297). The tests made it possible to discover flaws in the existing methods of bench testing of diesels that did not make it possible to determine their defects. [These flaws] were corrected.

At full power, the power plant of the Project 183 torpedo boat developed a top speed of 43-44 knots. The cruising speed was 33 knots (with a range of 600 miles), and the endurance speed was 14 knots (corresponding to a range of 1000 miles).

The armament of the boats included two 533-mm single non-trainable deck torpedo tubes (basic load of two torpedoes), and two 2M-3 25-mm twin automatic anti-aircraft machinegun mounts (later, 2M-3M type automatic mounts were installed). Like the latter, Fakel

identification radar and Zarnitsa search radar, used on torpedo boats of this project for the first time in the USSR, became an innovation for domestic torpedo boats. On the whole, in the opinion of seamen, the boats turned out successful and therefore became the "base" not only when creating a number of their modifications, but also in developing the design for the world's first guided-missile boat (Project 183-R).

One can single out the following from the main modifications of the Project 183 torpedo boats. Thus, Project 199 combatant craft were small submarine chasers for the Maritime Border Guard units. The Tamir sonar was installed on them (a total of 52 were built), and instead of torpedo armament, it had antisubmarine armament. A 4000-hp gas-turbine engine was tested for the first time in 1953 on the Project 183-T torpedo boat (installed in addition to the diesels). It was used as a booster engine, which made it possible to develop a speed of up to 50 knots. After this, 25 boats equipped with a standard diesel-gas-turbine power plant were built in Leningrad in 1956-1957 in accordance with the adjusted Project 183-TK. The main engine—a 4000-hp M-1 gas turbine—was created by specialists headed by S.D. Kolosov. With a displacement of 83 tonnes and hull dimensions similar to the Project 183, these boats could develop a speed of up to 52 knots.

It must be noted that two of the Project 183-TK series boats were equipped with a shallowly submerged bow hydrofoil. However, the design of these hydrofoils, made of stainless steel, unfortunately did not have sufficient strength.

A feature of torpedo boats of another modification—Project 183-A (the only one, a prototype)—was the presence of outer plating made of "arktilit," a material similar to a bakelized veneer. But since "arktilit" was soon removed from production, torpedo boats with this outer plating did not go into regular production.

There were also 60 boats built based on the Project 183 and used as radio-controlled high speed surface targets for training missile crews, artillerymen, and pilots. This modification was created according to Project 183-Ts. The last attempt to improve the specifications of the Project 183 BTKA's was the building in 1958 of an experimental boat with a displacement of 92 tonnes and equipped with new high speed diesels and four torpedo tubes. This Project 183-U proved to be unsuccessful and was not recommended for regular production.

It should be said that in the second half of the 1950's, under the direction of V.M. Burlakov (TsKB-19), two more projects of torpedo boats were built and given the numbers 184 and 125, respectively. They were built at the Feodosiya Shipbuilding Yard "More". Both series were small—two boats in each.

Project 184 boats were built in 1956. Their specifications were: Displacement of 34 tonnes; the aluminum stepless hull had a length of 21.6 meters, a beam of 5 meters, and a draft of about 2.1 meters. The maximum speed was 46 knots, and at a speed of 45 knots this torpedo boat had a

range of about 300 miles. It covered 500 miles at a speed of 33 knots. The endurance equaled two days. Armament included two 533-mm single non-trainable deck torpedo tubes and two twin 14.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun mounts.

The Project 125 boats were made according to one architectural design type, with a hydrofoil arrangement in the underwater bow portion and also with a turbine booster engine. The displacement of the Project 125 TKA was considerably more than the Project 184 boats—it was 60 tonnes. The hull dimensions were: length—25 meters; beam—4.9 meters; draft—2.6 meters. Its maximum speed (under two M-503 diesels, 4000 hp each) was 68 knots, and with simultaneous operation of the turbine booster engine with them (TRD-20P) with a thrust of 4000 kgf, it increased 5 knots. Tests showed that the Project 125 TKA could be used at speeds of up to 45 knots only at a sea state of up to 3 points, inclusively. Neither the Project 184 boats nor the Project 125 TKA's entered regular production.

Between 1956 and 1960, a new BTKA (code number 206) was developed to replace the Project 183 TKA in conditions of changing views toward the requirements on modern naval weapons and parallel with creation of guided-missile boats in TsKB-5 (later reorganized into the Central Naval Design Bureau [TsMKB] "Almaz"). The chief designer of the project was P.G. Goynkis.


The Project 206 boat was created in a steel hull. According to the initial detail design, it was to have a displacement of around 160 tonnes, a full speed of 45 knots, and a cruising speed of 35 knots (corresponding to a range of 600 miles). At endurance speed, the range was 1000 miles. Subsequently, considering that the principal dimensions of this TKA (length—33.6, beam—6.74, and draft—3.75 meters) were close to the similar Project 205 large guided-missile boat developed during those years by the same Central Naval Design Bureau, the decision was made "...to build the Project 206 boat in the same hull and with the identical power plant as the Project 205 guided-missile boat."

The power plant was a three-shaft unit. Initially it consisted of three M-503 diesels; later they were to be replaced by more modern modifications, in particular, the 5000-hp M-503A and M-504 diesels. The electrical power system was represented by three diesel generators with a total power of 84 kW. The latter generated a current of 220 volts.

The Project 206 BTKA's armament included four 533-mm OTA-53-206 single non-trainable deck torpedo tubes; a torpedo director system for providing guidance during torpedo firing, which gets the required information from the radar; two AK-230 twin 30-mm automatic artillery mounts with a rate of fire of up to 1000 rounds per minute with a ready inventory of 500 shells per barrel; remotely guided from the MR-104 gun fire control radar.

The lead and regular production Project 206 boats were built at the Yaroslavl Shipbuilding Yard. The welded hull of the lead BTKA was made of high-alloyed steel; however, it







Project 206 large torpedo boat

proved to be very difficult to weld it, and it ended up with a large number of welding defects. The director of the shipyard at that time, D.T. Dutchenko, decided to condemn the hull of the lead boat and "put it under a pile driver." Such actions were unexpected for the designers, the production engineers, and even for representatives of the client—staff officers of the Navy's Main Directorate of Shipbuilding. A way out of the situation was found by radically improving the quality of the welding and assembly of the hull as a whole. It must be noted that the hulls made at the Yaroslavl yards also remained better later than those produced at the shipbuilding yards of Leningrad and Vladivostok. A total of 123 combatant units were built under Project 206 and its modifications.

Among the Project 206 modifications, we must make note of the Project 206-M torpedo boats, (they served as the base

for developing the export Project 206-ME). Initially, the chief designer of the Project 206-M was I.P. Pegov, but he was later replaced by A.P. Gorodyanko. Development of the project was concluded in 1967. In addition to the basic design features and decisions made on the base project, they provided for a bow hydrofoil arrangement created several years earlier. As a result, it proved possible to ensure use of the new BTKA without restrictions at a sea state of up to 4 points; inclusively, at speeds up to 40 knots; and at a sea state of up to 5 points, at a speed up to 35 knots. The changes made by Project 206-M with respect to Project 206 also affected the electrical power system of the new boat—the latter was made on alternating current.

The Project 206-M BTKA had different armament than the Project 206 TKA. The two 30-mm gun mounts were replaced by an AK-725 twin 57-mm automatic mount



Project 206-M large torpedo boat

with a gun fire control radar on the stern and a 25-mm gun mount on the forecastle. The torpedo armament was similar to the Project 206 TKA.

According to the detail design, the large torpedo boat had the following basic specifications and performance characteristics: Standard displacement—220 tonnes; displacement loaded—250 tonnes; full speed—over 40 knots; cruising speed—37 knots (at this speed the range was about 600 miles). Beginning in 1970, the Project 206-M boats were built in regular production. As experts believe, they surpass considerably the Project 206

BTKA's in combat capabilities, which was helped by their increased combat and operational qualities. This enabled these boats to accomplish their main combat missions with greater effectiveness, making torpedo strikes against surface targets and artillery engagement with high-speed lightly armored enemy weapon systems; and, in addition, to participate in accomplishing such a task of antisubmarine defense as making a torpedo attack against an underwater target as part of a tactical group using homing antisubmarine torpedoes.

The Project 206-ME and 02065 large torpedo boats, intended for export, were built between 1960 and 1990

at several shipbuilding yards in our country—at MSP Shipbuilding Yard No. 5 (now the “Almaz” SO, St. Petersburg), the Sredne-Neva Shipbuilding Yard, in Vladivostok, Rybinsk, and Yaroslavl. The long-term stable delivery of these combat units was accounted for

by their high speed and seaworthy qualities, the operating reliability of the weapon systems installed on them, the boats themselves, and also their systems and devices.

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## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Black Sea Pact, Russian Intentions Assailed

934K2428A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
10 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Ivan Zayets, people's deputy of Ukraine and head of People's Council in the Supreme Council; transcribed by Taras Davydyak: "Only on the Basis of Equal Rights"]

[Text] Recent events show convincingly that we have to carry out, as soon as possible, the second stage of the national-democratic revolution. This is the decolonization and the decommunization of society, and above all, of the government.

We are now going through what the experience of the countries of so-called "people's democracy" showed. The colonial power is very corrupted and commercialized. It cannot develop mechanisms of resistance to extreme pressure from Russia. Thus, I think, we are today on the threshold of the second stage of the revolution, which must be encouraged: Decommunization and decolonization. The People's Council is demanding access to television, where representatives of the important political parties will discuss the situation in Ukraine, and, especially, the recent meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia in Massandra. Second—the democratic forces cannot stay on the sidelines in the growing wave of strikes. We understand that strikes destabilize the situation and undermine our economy, but if they are without direction, or even more if they are directed by the red directorate or pro-Russian communist forces, as happened with the miners, then they in fact take on the force of a nuclear explosion for the destruction of our economy. Thus, it is necessary to develop approaches that will work in the same direction as the strike movement.

What took place in the Crimea was the result of the government crisis. It is necessary to resolve this problem by constitutional reform—reform of the government. Orientation toward any one particular position is harmful. We must immediately pass a law to make the Supreme Council a professionally working body, to carry out new elections, and when the new deputies arrive, to raise immediately the question of the president's resignation. What he sold on Russia's prompting is far from weaponry. It concerns the form of the Armed Forces, but it is territory, and people, and other things. If we sell to Russia a part, or actually our own part—50 percent—of the ships, this means that we are transferring to it a fully structured, complete fleet, which is, structurally, fully ready. It has only to be technologically renovated. Thus, not much effort is necessary for Russia to have a powerful, fully structured fleet. I do not think that we have a fully structured fleet, on the Black Sea or even on our own land. If the point that we cannot maintain this fleet is raised, that there are no strategic goals in this region, then it is necessary to raise the question of principle. Let

us talk about demilitarizing the Black Sea basin. This will make sense. Since Leonid Makarovych says that we have no money to maintain it, I do not think that the question of our national security and the question of guaranteeing our statehood do not demand any additional funds. I would not disarm and imagine that the path of full disarmament of Ukraine, in absolutely all ways, is a condition for securing peaceful paths for the building of our state. This is a lie, a misunderstanding and ignorance of both social and international processes. We have to have nuclear arms. The worst thing in this meeting is not the discussion about the sale of the fleet—this is a delaying maneuver. The discussion touched on the point that we will sell the nuclear warheads of strategic rockets, and then Russia will compensate our costs over the course of a year. While nuclear arms are a restraining factor and while this armament remains on our land—there will be no war with Russia. Nuclear disarmament itself is the danger which creates the possibility of armed conflict with Russia. Unfortunately, our president and his advisers do not understand this. In fact, this is where the tragedy of this meeting lies, and not in the fact that there was discussion about the sale of the fleet. No one will allow anyone to sell the fleet. Here the question is more profound, and it has to be seen in what might be called a triad—the economic union, nuclear disarmament, and directly in the events concerning the Black Sea Fleet. On the one hand, we are being provoked on territorial issues, and on the other we are being completely disarmed, and the economic groundwork is being laid, so that Ukraine will never get out of the economic union.

We have to understand clearly why precisely now the question of the economic union has come up. In this problem there are questions both of a geopolitical scale, and internal ones; there are questions concerning Russia and concerning our procommunist forces, which actually are concentrated in the presidential structures and in the councils of people's deputies. If we speak about Russia, then we have to understand clearly that it is hurrying to realize its own geopolitical interests. In what do they lie? When the USSR existed, it in fact dominated all regions of the planet. Since Russia was the core of the Russian Empire, since the Russian tradition lay at the basis of the USSR's statehood, this was all associated with Russia. Thus, the entire economy, the entire mentality of the Russian state was directed toward the realization of the imperial idea—the readiness to realize the imperial idea of the "transformation of territories."

With the disintegration of the USSR, the zones of influence disintegrated as well—the distant states are gone, in fact also the countries of "people's democracy" are gone, and the "near abroad" remains. Thus, Russia is hurrying to seize for itself as a bridgehead this same near abroad. The idea of an economic union has been put forward for this. This is the first thing. The second thing is to try to stop the process of disintegration which is growing in Russia itself. The process of federalization which has begun there will definitely end with the



collapse of Russia. This will push Russia to economic war against Ukraine. The third thing is that in Russia they are noting that Ukraine stands before the stage of the crisis and reform of the government. Thus, all there are calculating that the government in Ukraine, which is colonial, corrupt, and commercialized, will never be able to defend its people, much less to create its own state. Thus, Russia is trying to squeeze the maximum out of this collaborationist, procommunist government. The fourth thing is that Russia is trying to produce in its own midst those vitally necessary and important products which are to be found in the countries of the near abroad. Thus, it needs the economic union and the colonial structure of the Ukrainian economy, which would make impossible the interruption of this process. Then the Ukrainian economy will perform the role of donor for the structural rebuilding of the Russian economy. The fifth thing is that in Russia they understand perfectly that when both Ukraine and Russia are independent, relations between them will be worked out under the rules of international law. And here it will be impossible to utilize fully its own economic dominance.

We are for the development of economic ties, but on the basis of full equal rights.

#### Status of Grachev-Karakashvili Talks

93UM0858A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Petr Karapetyan: "Russia and Georgia a Step Closer to Summit Meeting": "Series of Intergovernmental Agreements Signed in Moscow"]

[Text] In talks held in Moscow on 15 September with General Georgiy Karakashvili, head of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, Russian Minister of Defense Army General Pavel Grachev linked the problem of effecting economic and military cooperation between the two countries with resolution of the problem of refugees from South Ossetia. Pavel Grachev stressed that if this problem is not settled and the status of South Ossetia with respect to Georgia not determined, it will be difficult to expect successful resolution of questions related to economic relations between Russia and Georgia.

Also discussed were a draft agreement on status of the Russian troops in Georgia and problems of cooperation between the defense ministries of the two countries. Russia's Minister of Defense tied successful resolution of those problems to the signing of a basic bilateral agreement on friendship, cooperation, mutual assistance, and attainment of a lasting peace in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Pavel Grachev, taking into account the situation in Georgia, considered it possible to recommend to the president and prime minister of Russia that work on the basic agreement be accelerated.

General Georgiy Karakashvili then stated that Georgia is honoring the political accords made with Russia, and he

assumed that "all the terms of the agreement on problem settlement in Abkhazia will be carried out by the end of this month."

On the same day, Russian Council of Ministers Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin and Georgian Prime Minister Otari Patsatsiya signed intergovernmental agreements on: Redrafting the indebtedness for 1992 technical credits for application to the state credit of the Government of Georgia, on Russia's making credit available to Georgia in 1993, on a protocol relating to trade and economic cooperation in 1993, and other matters.

Fulfillment of the commitments made in Moscow is directly dependent upon development of the situation in Georgia. The latter continues to be quite serious. The "Zviadists," who are now entrenched in western Georgia, have cut off the central part of the country from the Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti, and they are preparing to launch an offensive against the strategically important cities of Vani and Zestafoni. The government has airlifted an additional military contingent to the western part of the country. On 16 September, Eduard Shevardnadze issued an order initiating combat operations against followers of ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. At 5 a.m. on 16 September, Abkhaz units renewed their activity in the vicinity of Ochamchira.

The Moscow talks reaffirmed the RF [Russian Federation] Ministry of Defense's intention to concentrate its troops in Tbilisi (headquarters of the GRVZ [Gruppa Rossiyskikh Voysk v Zakavkaze]), Batumi (145th Motorized Rifle Division), and Akhalkalaki (147th Motorized Rifle Division). The situation in Georgia is raising serious concerns relating to the fate of the Russian servicemen. Given a certain set of circumstances, they may well become trapped in the epicenter of events. That is why the problems plaguing the large units—an acute shortage of personnel, lack of normal social and service conditions, and general supply problems—demand immediate resolution.

## UKRAINE

### International Cooperation in Nuclear Disarmament

#### Foreign Ministry Disputes Russian Accusations

93UM0842A Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian 27 Jul 93 p 1

[Unattributed news item]

[Text] The MZS [Ministry of the Foreign Affairs] press center distributed a communique that states that ITAR-TASS has transmitted through its channels a statement of the MZS of Russia which could be regarded as an attempt to shift the responsibility for delaying the process of nuclear disarmament onto Ukraine. The Ukrainian MZS press center stated that the suspicions and certain premature conclusions that are contained in the statement of the MZS of Russia have no foundation. Ukraine affirms its readiness to collaborate with Russia,

as well as other nations, in the search for constructive approaches to resolving issues connected with nuclear arms and national security.

### **Foreign Ministry Welcomes Nuclear Testing Moratorium**

93UM0842B Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed news item]

[Text] Ukraine welcomes the decision of the two largest nuclear powers—the Russian Federation and the United States—to continue the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, says a statement from the MZS of Ukraine press center. Ukraine also greeted with satisfaction the statement of the government of Great Britain on its positive attitude toward the problem of a complete ban on nuclear testing. Ukraine, the statement emphasizes, hopes that the logical and consistent incarnation of the process of nuclear disarmament will lead to a nuclear-free world.

### **Ukrainians Participate in NATO Conference**

93UM0842C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 10 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Ukraine—Facts, Arguments, Commentary, Opinions": "Overall Stability Under Conditions of Disarmament"]

[Text] That is the name of a scientific conference conducted by NATO in which a Ukrainian delegation will take part. This forum, as reported by UNIA, will begin on 13 August in the Sicilian city of Erice (Italy), and will consider the problems of dismantling, storage and neutralization of nuclear warheads and questions of international collaboration in the realm of converting defense resources. It will provide a scientific evaluation of the effects of the social crisis in certain nations on world nuclear stability. The Ukrainian delegation includes Serhiy Pyrozhev, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, the director of the Scientific-Hygienic Center of Ukraine, Andriy Serdyuk, and other specialists on questions of nuclear security. The paper "The Geopolitical Interests of Ukraine in the Context of National Security" will be presented. Its aim is to clarify for the NATO scholars that the dismantling of nuclear weapons is more of a political problem than a scientific one for Ukraine, insofar as all of the nuclear scientific and technical potential is concentrated in Russia. Ukraine will thus not be making any new arms.

### **Arms Control & Disarmament Chief Looks to World Disarmament**

93UM0842D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 14 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Major Volodymyr Knysh: "World Nuclear Disarmament is a Reality"]

[Text] ...feels the chief of the Administration for Arms Control and Disarmament of the MZS of Ukraine, Kostyantyn Hrishchenko.

*While the number of features in the press and programs on television on the so-called "nuclear" theme have decreased, that in no way signifies that its twilight has passed. It has, on the contrary, only just begun. Even though passions and emotions have abated and the views of politicians and journalists have lost their impulsiveness and extremes and have become realistic and considered, features sometimes appear with very loose treatments of the topic of nuclear disarmament.*

If we are talking about those who are formulating the policy of our state—the MZS—then our foreign-policy agency is constantly following the development of events not only in official circles, but also how they are reflected in the press. And it makes "corrections" in the latter, clarifying its stance pertaining to issues of nuclear disarmament. That was done at the last briefing by a member of the collegium of the MZS and chief of the Administration for Arms Control and Disarmament of the foreign-policy agency, Kostyantyn Hrishchenko.

What is the situation that has taken shape surrounding nuclear weapons? Before giving an answer to that question, it must be stressed that our parliament is only now considering a whole package connected with the process of nuclear disarmament. It is thus too soon to hope for final conclusions. They lie ahead.

There have been many different opinions of late on the adoption of basic guidelines for the foreign policy of Ukraine by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and, in particular, the provisions that discuss the fact that, having become the possessor of nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR through historical circumstances, Ukraine has never sanctioned their use, eliminating from its arsenal of foreign policy the threat of their utilization.

Commenting on this specific provision, Kostyantyn Hrishchenko directed attention to the fact that a verification of the actual situation is given, insofar as from a legal standpoint it was defined in the Law of Economic Independence of the UkSSR of 1990 and the Law on Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations of All-Union Subordination that are located on the territory of Ukraine of 10 September 1991. These two laws are based on the norms of the legal succession of states and, in particular, on the Vienna Convention of 1983.

Ukraine, as the possessor of nuclear weapons, has transferred the right to use them to the combined command of the strategic forces of the CIS, provided control over the non-employment of those weapons on its part is ensured.

"This situation was only fixed in the documents adopted by the Supreme Soviet, and there are no grounds whatsoever to get excited," observed Kostyantyn Hrishchenko.

If we look at it from the legal standpoint, he reported, the unilateral actions of Russia cannot be recognized as legal fact. Thus, the situation remains unchanged today. That is to say, the strategic offensive and nuclear forces

stationed in Ukraine are under the operational command of the combined strategic forces of the CIS today. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine exercises only administrative control over them.

But Mr. Hrishchenko indicated that there is an attempt on the part of the corresponding Russian structures to resubordinate those forces. "We must proceed from the fact that only those who made the decision can alter it, and not just one of its participants," emphasized Kostyantyn Hrishchenko.

He does not agree with the stance of certain circles that Russia is the sole legal successor to the former USSR and is trying to accomplish that through the question of nuclear weapons. "There are four nations that had strategic and tactical nuclear arms on their territory. And they have equal rights. Each of the nations has determined its own policy and attitudes," said Mr. Hrishchenko. He emphasized that the situation in Ukraine is unchanged until our parliament makes a final decision.

But no one objects to a policy of peace: That there be no nuclear weapons not only in Ukraine, but in the world as well. The efforts of international collaboration have to be directed namely at that. But a situation where some nations are trying to remain outside the process of nuclear disarmament cannot be considered normal. The entire international community has to take advantage of the historic chance that arose after the collapse of the former USSR, to take the path of cutbacks to overall world nuclear disarmament. That is not all that unrealistic a goal, in the opinion of Kostyantyn Hrishchenko.

#### **Ukraine-US Conversations on Nuclear Disarmament**

93UM0842E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
2 Sep 93 p 1

[Article from "NA" Inf. under the rubric "Events": "Ukraine-United States: Nuclear Negotiations"]

[Text] *Ukrainian-American negotiations on questions of granting Ukraine technical assistance from the United States, aimed at implementing concrete programs to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons, have been held in Kiev. The MZS press center has reported that the discussions concerned granting funds in the sum of 175 million dollars, in accordance with the Nunn-Lugar amendment.*

A so-called framework agreement was discussed, which is needed to define the legal principles for the granting of such assistance, along with implementation agreements that define in detail the mechanism of that assistance. The rest of the discussion was about four agreements between the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and the U.S. Department of Defense on the accounting, monitoring and physical protection of nuclear materials, with the aim of fostering the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

They also discussed an agreement between the military departments of Ukraine and the United States to grant our state equipment and to conduct the corresponding training to minimize the consequences of possible accident situations. Questions of training for variations of actions during the period of removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and their destruction, as well as the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles and their launch silos, were touched on as well.

Several more agreements were discussed between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the United States that pertain to offering our nation equipment, services and the organization of training with the aim of establishing intergovernmental lines of communication, as well as assistance in establishing a system of expert monitoring for the purpose of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine.

The 175 million dollars that were discussed, in the words of the MZS press center spokesperson, do not rule out the possibility of later full compensation to Ukraine for all expenditures connected with the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons.

#### **Reports of ICBM Retention Refuted**

##### **Bizhan Denies Retaining 176 ICBM's**

93UM0841C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
19 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Statement of Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine"]

[Text] Some of the mass media, referring to an interview with Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan by BBC, have disseminated the information that Ukraine is able to block the control of Moscow over the 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles on its territory, and that it would soon have possession of the codes as well.

The press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has been authorized to make the statement that Colonel-General I. Bizhan did not give such information to the BBC correspondent.

A question of that substance was asked by a correspondent of that agency, to which was given the answer that Ukraine has the capability not to permit the employment of the strategic nuclear forces that are stationed on its territory, but as for the development or possession of codes, that contradicts the state policy of Ukraine with regard to nuclear weapons and that such work is not being conducted.

### **Ministry Says Bizhan Misquoted in BBC Interview**

93UM0841D Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian  
20 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed news item]

[Text] Some of the mass media, referring to an interview with Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General I. Bizhan by BBC radio, have disseminated the information that Ukraine is able to block the control of Moscow over the 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles on its territory, and that it would soon have possession of the launch codes of the missiles as well. The press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has stated that Bizhan did not give such information to BBC. A correspondent actually did ask about this, but he was told that Ukraine has the capability not to permit the employment of the strategic nuclear forces that are stationed on its territory.

### **Maj-Gen Skipalskyy On Role of New Military Intelligence Directorate**

93UM0839 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
28 Aug 93 p 2

[Article by Major-General O. Skipalskyy, chief of the Chief Directorate of Military Intelligence: "Military Intelligence in Service to Ukraine"]

[Text] Ukraine has celebrated the second anniversary of its independence. And however difficult these years may have been, speaking in the words of the Moscow newspaper SEGODNYA, "even the most rabid opponents of the independence of Ukraine would rub their eyes in surprise if you tell them that there will again be a garrison in their city starting tomorrow, manned, say, half by Georgians and half by Uzbeks and subordinate, naturally, to Moscow. An inhabitant of Ukraine of any nationality today cannot even conceive that he would be sent to serve in Tajikistan or is being taken off to serve out a sentence in Kolyma. Those ways already seem far off, receded irreversibly into the past."

In order to ensure the irreversibility of the process of winning independence, the steady development of society and the protection of the basic interests of the nation and its spiritual and material welfare against foreign and domestic threats, a system for ensuring national security is being built in Ukraine. Since an aggregate of guarantees is achieved by the comprehensive utilization of the economic, scientific, technical, military, legal and information potential, the system to ensure national security is formed from the corresponding subsystems, each of which is endowed with certain functions.

The foreign policy of Ukraine is based on a comprehensive analysis of the political, economic and military climate and the interrelationships of various forces on the world stage that exist at a given moment. Their

uninterrupted complication in certain regions requires constant efforts, aimed at studying and evaluating the situation, in order for the supreme leadership of the state to make the correct decisions on questions of foreign policy and military development that correspond to the demands of the national security of Ukraine.

The existence of structures called upon to obtain information is thus essential to provide constant information for supreme state and military bodies. Intelligence is the chief structure among them. The Chief Directorate of Military Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense was created recently by edict of President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk. The Law on Defense, the draft military doctrine, and other documents of Ukraine do not define a specific adversary under contemporary conditions. However, regardless of the changes in the geopolitical situation, and taking into account that no territorial ambitions have been expressed either officially or unofficially toward our country, the threat of being drawn into armed conflicts nonetheless exists. It is essential in this regard to anticipate and adopt means of preventing threats. Whence the principal task of intelligence—to be "the eyes and ears" of the state.

One may cite an example from world experience as confirmation of the necessity of such a structure. A presidential order of the United States pertaining to intelligence activity, without mentioning the Warsaw Pact, emphasizes that "contemporary and accurate information about the activity, potential, plans and intentions of foreign nations, individuals and their representatives is exceedingly important for the protection of the national security of the United States. All reasonable and legal means for America to obtain intelligence information of the highest order must be utilized."

We are cutting back our armed forces. And here we should again mention world experience—the smaller the armed forces of a country, the larger, stronger and more far-flung should be its intelligence; able to warn the state and military leadership of the country in a timely manner of the most genuine and dangerous threats to national security (the clearest example of this is Israel and its intelligence).

The experience of recent military conflicts around the world (the war in the Persian Gulf, the Yugoslavian crisis and the events in Somalia, among others) also testify that the absence of reliable intelligence information is one of the routes to crisis or war. The leading countries of the world are thus carrying out measures today to increase the operational effectiveness of individual bodies, strengthen the information-analytical structures and subdivisions and utilize all possible means to obtain information.

We are working vigorously today on the creation of organizational structures. There are plenty of obstacles, both natural and artificial, on that path. After the collapse of the USSR the main base of intelligence moved to Moscow, which left us in the position of



pioneers, so to speak. Add to that the economic difficulties of Ukraine, which are also slowing the development of the structures of military intelligence to a significant degree. But those are artificial obstacles. All are perhaps not suited by the independence of Ukraine, and with it the independence of its intelligence. We are getting if not blows, then at least little stings, instead of assistance on the part of certain circles and even structures. Some of the mass media are also supporting them in this. People's Deputies Charodeyev and Marchenko, for example, accusing the political regime of Ukraine of "death throes," are utilizing the arsenal of the Cold War with their sights aimed at O. Skipalskyy. As for me, then let them go, all the same... things are passing them by. But by criticizing the head of intelligence they are striking a blow against the very intelligence of the armed forces of the young nation, thereby going after a true patriot of Ukraine and courageous defender of its independence—Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov. Our parliamentarians are even quoting the newspaper PRAVDA. Skipalskyy, you see, showed the Americans a Tu-160 aircraft, the traits and characteristics of which have long been published in many NATO journals. The head of American military intelligence would be a poor man indeed if the United States had such deputies. They would have literally eaten him alive for the fact that he permitted Minister of Defense of Ukraine K. Morozov into the cockpit of the latest F-18 American aircraft. And not even just to sit, but even to fly on the U.S. military aircraft.

The military intelligence of Ukraine is just getting onto its feet. We are forced to resolve a whole series of questions simultaneously. Units for peacetime intelligence are already operating (radio and electronic intelligence), and the officer corps is being prepared. We are proceeding from the fact that the training of an intelligence officer is a complicated, intense, and prolonged process. While an infantryman, driver or other specialist can be trained and put into service in one or two weeks, this cannot be done with an intelligence officer. And if you say to us, why do we need, say, special-purpose forces during peacetime, this is exactly a case where such a specialists cannot be trained in a week. This is not the protection of an individual, this is ensuring the protection of the state.

The Chief Directorate of Military Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine assures the people of Ukraine that it will do everything to defend our path to freedom and independence. The intelligence officers are demonstrating real patriotism through their loyalty to the ideas of freedom and their concrete and sincere work to build the statehood of Ukraine.

I would like to conclude with the words of the eminent European scholar Ch. Steymets, which he said at the very beginning of the building of the state of Israel: "The small peoples will become free, and intelligence will help them with it." How is that not topical for the 55 million people of Ukraine?

### Use of SS-19's, SS-24's for Aerospace Research Proposed

93UM0841B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
31 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed item: "Space Orbit of Ukraine"]

[Text] The reputation of Ukraine as a nation that has considerable potential for international collaboration in the conquest of space is growing. The world community has been broadly informed, in particular at the last session of the Committee for the Utilization of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes that was held in New York, of the readiness of our country to take part in such spheres as telecommunications, navigation, geodesy and cartography, meteorology, ecological monitoring and the exploration of natural resources etc. Ukrainian proposals for the joint utilization of SS-19 and SS-24 missiles stationed on the territory of Ukraine to launch payloads for peaceful purposes, the development of aviation-space systems based on widebody aircraft of the Mriya type, the utilization of Ukrainian scientific-research vessels with unique and modern equipment for the control of spacecraft in joint projects and the development of systems of satellite communications were of significant interest to representatives of the American national space agency.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Georgian Naval Officers Training at Batumi

93UM0858B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Denisov (Tbilisi): "Georgian Black Sea Fleet's New Military Academy"]

[Text] As of 20 October of this year, there will be a Naval Department in the Combined Military Academy at the Batumi Higher Naval School for producing specialists for Georgia's Naval Forces.

However, Georgia's Ministry of Defense qualified its announcement by stating that the department will accept only youths fluent in the Georgian language. All others apparently must seek an education elsewhere.

### Abkhazia: Potential For Wider Conflict

93UM0864C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
22 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Pyotr Karapetyan: "Conflict in Abkhazia Threatens to Become Wider War Unless Reason Prevails"]

[Text] It is hard to shake the feeling that what is now taking place in Abkhazia was inevitable. And who violated the cease-fire first is not all that important: The Georgians could have done the same with equal success. And I don't exclude the possibility that they would have

done so at zero hour. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why they withdrew only damaged equipment from the conflict zone and turned down, under the most diverse pretexts, Russian offers of help in evacuating their weapons.

Zero hour for the Abkhazians came sooner and coincided with the conflict in the Georgian parliament and the launching of the Gamsakhurdia forces' offensive in Western Georgia. The Abkhazians' heavy equipment, which had been prudently withdrawn a symbolic distance away from the confrontation line, also "shot up" the Sochi agreements at dawn on September 16.

So are the Abkhazians to blame for everything? Without trying to excuse their actions, some observers maintain that the Sochi agreements could not have served as the basis for peace in the region. For after a superficial statement about the need to return legally elected government bodies to Sukhumi, the two sides sidestepped the main issue: Who is to be deemed the legally elected authority—Vladislav Ardzinba and his Gudauta team, or the pro-Georgian Supreme Soviet, led by "Shevardnadze's man," Zhiuli Sharava?

Some complain that the failure to resolve this issue in Sochi is what led to the guns' opening fire. Of course, after the fact one can regret the failure to move peace-keeping forces into the buffer zone right after the armed units were withdrawn from the conflict zone. But the following question arises, and it is a big question: Would they have been able to control the situation for very long against the backdrop of the pathological obstinacy of both Georgian and Abkhazian politicians, who, one gets the impression, are more preoccupied with their own ambitions than with common sense?

And so, it turns out, Russia is to blame for everything! Moscow had only to take the step—undoubtedly justified by the situation—of imposing harsh economic sanctions against Abkhazia when certain forces hastened to accuse it of taking a pro-Georgian position. On the other hand, Moscow had only to put forward its proposals for a settlement of the renewed conflict in Abkhazia for Tbilisi to accuse Russia of wanting to "occupy Georgia."

And what about Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba? Without question, in refusing to leave besieged Sukhumi and declaring his readiness to defend it with his bare hands, Eduard Shevardnadze is showing that he is not the timid type. But his open unwillingness to take the natural path, dictated by the situation, of holding talks with Ardzinba, just because talks with the latter would not be at "his level", is bewildering. As for Ardzinba, the events of recent days show that he has lost control over the field commanders. Consequently, if he does have any influence on the situation in the conflict zone, it is clearly insufficient.

The war in Abkhazia will surely transcend the bounds of a local conflict if the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Russia are inconsistent in implementing the mechanism fashioned at the Sochi

meeting for a peaceful settlement of the Abkhaz problem. But their efforts could prove futile unless they are augmented by wisdom on the part of the Georgian and Abkhaz leaders.

#### **Abkhaz Offensive Against Sukhumi**

93UM0864B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Denisov, Pyotr Karapetyan: "Georgian Units Have Their Backs to the Sea"]

[Text] Nearly 50 people have been killed and 450 injured in the conflict zone since combat operations resumed in Abkhazia on September 16. The attempts by Abkhaz armed units to take Sukhumi have been unsuccessful thus far, but the situation of Georgian detachments, which have their backs to the sea, could be termed disastrous.

After unsuccessful attempts on the night of September 18 to land an assault force in the area of Ochamchira and Babushara (site of the Sukhumi airport) in Gulripsh Rayon, an Abkhaz ship moved up the coast and opened fire on Babushara with a 'Grad' [multiple] rocket launcher.

Intense fighting continues on the outskirts of Sukhumi and in the city itself. On the evening of September 19, Colonel Loti Kobaliya, who led the rebellion against Eduard Shevardnadze in Western Georgia, brought a unit of about 200 men loyal to Zviad Gamsakhurdia to Sukhumi and immediately went into battle on the side of Georgian government forces. The day before, he had met with Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia and agreed to lift the railroad blockade in Western Georgia within 24 hours.

Ochamchira Rayon, through which help from Georgia is making its way to Sukhumi, is under the control of Abkhaz units. With the exception of a few airplanes that were able to get through to Sukhumi, the Georgian units have received no reinforcements.

As of this writing, Abkhaz units have tightened the ring around Sukhumi, having advanced another three kilometers. The Georgians control only the coastal part of the city, an area about 2.5 kilometers wide.

On September 19 in Nalchik, residents of Kabardino-Balkaria began an open-ended rally in support of the Abkhazians. Volunteers are being signed up at the rally (now more than 1,000 people), and the first buses carrying them to the Abkhaz border have already departed.

### RF Defense Ministry Press Conference: Conflict In Abkhazia

93UM0864A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Urban: "Only Sanctions Against Combatants Will Stop Conflict in Abkhazia. Russian Federation Defense Minister Holds Press Conference"]

[Text] Why has the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict flared up once more? How can the bloodshed be stopped? What role should be played by Russia, which is the guarantor of the cease-fire agreement? Last Saturday, journalists were able to obtain first-hand answers, so to speak, to these questions. The Russian Defense Minister, General of the Army Pavel Grachev, after a trip to the conflict zone, arrived on a flight from Sochi at 10:25 and just an hour later held a press conference for Russian and foreign mass media.

#### Causes of the Cease-fire Violation.

General of the Army Pavel Grachev reported that in connection with the deteriorating situation on the Georgian-Abkhaz front and by order of the Russian Federation president, he had left on a flight to Gudauta on the evening of September 16 and arrived at his destination at 00:30 on September 17. Throughout the night, the defense minister heard reports from the command of the Russian forces temporarily stationed in Abkhazia. The reports made clear that both sides had committed serious violations of the Abkhaz cease-fire agreement in the conflict zone.

For example, despite the cease-fire, the Abkhaz side had been the first to open fire on the eastern front. This triggered a sort of chain reaction. Combat operations immediately resumed on both the eastern front and in the area of Sukhumi. Neither Abkhaz nor Georgian leaders could influence the situation.

I came to the firm conclusion, the Minister said, that not all the military units involved in the conflict were under the control of the political and military leadership of Georgia and Abkhazia. There were groups in the combat areas that could provoke an armed clash, which is what happened on the eastern sector.

There were also violations of point six of the agreement. Despite numerous statements, arms and combat hardware had not been fully withdrawn from the combat zone. The Georgians had withdrawn mostly equipment in need of repair. And the Abkhazians, though they had withdrawn their equipment, had removed it to a location so near the front that it could easily be put in action in a short time if necessary.

All these factors promoted a situation in which a conflict provoked on one sector developed into active combat operations.

#### Meetings With V. Ardzinba and E. Shevardnadze.

On the morning of September 17, Pavel Grachev recounted, at the staff of the 345th Regiment, he met with Vladislav Ardzinba for more than 90 minutes. The Russian Defense Minister proposed an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Abkhaz forces to the separation line established in the cease-fire agreement. Unfortunately, by that time the situation was such that Abkhaz units had approached the western outskirts of Sukhumi and occupied commanding heights around the city. Thus, Ardzinba rejected all these proposals. He was virtually unable to influence the field commanders, who, for understandable reasons, would have flatly refused to pull back and give up the terrain they had won in battle. The chairman of the Abkhaz parliament promised only that his forces would not enter the city, much less engage in combat operations against the civilian population.

Given this situation, Pavel Grachev continued, it was proposed that Ardzinba meet with Georgian Chief of State Eduard Shevardnadze in Sukhumi and suspend combat operations for the duration of their talks. Ardzinba agreed to such a meeting only in Russia. But Shevardnadze, it was soon learned, had flatly refused to hold direct talks with the Abkhaz leader.

At 12:00 on September 17, the Russian Defense Minister held a meeting with the Georgian leader in Adler. There, Shevardnadze reiterated his refusal to hold talks with Ardzinba. And when the Georgian side began insisting once more that Russia use its Armed Forces to influence the situation, the Russian Defense Minister continued, I put forward an unexpected proposal, considering that the sides had rejected political methods. It was a plan (devised the night before) for using additional manpower and materiel from the Russian side along the entire length of the Georgian-Abkhaz front. Two divisions and one brigade would be air-lifted in and landed at two airfields (Gudauta and Sukhumi). They would then go into the combat areas, separate and block the opposing forces, and disarm them. In this way, the conflict could be ended in two or three days. Naturally, the separation and disarming would be carried out without destruction of the warring groups, with the consent of the Abkhazians and the Georgians, and on the basis of goodwill on their part. From that point it would be up to the politicians to come to terms.

But members of the Georgian delegation took an extremely negative view of this proposal, at which point I observed, Pavel Grachev stressed at the press conference, that this was merely a proposal and that the decision rested with them. Moreover, the plan could be carried out only after it had been approved by the Russian Federation president and Supreme Soviet, which had the full right to disagree with the option. But as defense minister, I saw no other way out of the situation in the conflict zone except through the use of larger forces.

Since that proposal too was rejected, I had to ask the Georgian leadership: Just what do you want of Russia, how is it supposed to influence your internal conflict? The following request was made: To reinforce the 901st Independent Airborne Battalion stationed in Sukhumi and deploy it along the separation line along the Gumista River. If you look at the map, you can see from the length of the front that no 200 to 300 men along the confrontation line would be able to salvage the situation, and that Russian troops themselves would sustain losses. The Russian Defense Minister said that the option was illogical. Especially considering that, under the July 27 agreement, Russian forces temporarily stationed in Abkhazia are to maintain strict neutrality, and international peace-keeping forces are to be used to enforce the ceasefire. A Russian military contingent could be used only after consultations with the UN. And so, Pavel Grachev said, I could not take any independent decision under those circumstances.

#### **How Can the Conflict Be Stopped?**

Ending the war is mainly the task of Georgia itself. And if it is essential that Russia help in this, it should be

asked to do so in a manner that complies with all international regulations and in accordance with the UN decisions, said Pavel Grachev. In my view, he emphasized, neither the Georgian side nor the Abkhaz side wants peace at this time. And so this matter should be resolved not by Russia alone, but within the UN framework. The Russian Defense Minister also proposed that tough political, economic, and other sanctions be imposed on all the parties to the conflict simultaneously.

Responding to questions from journalists, Pavel Grachev reported the Russian President was already aware of the outcome of the talks that were held and of the proposals. The Defense Minister also pointed out once more that he opposes the use of the Russian Armed Forces in combat in the conflict. "I don't want to be cursed by my people," Pavel Grachev said in conclusion. "They can only be used as peace-keeping forces."

Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, took part in the press conference, as did Colonel-General Viktor Barynkin, chief of the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate.



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